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“When by birth a child is subject to a father it is for the general
interest of children and really for the interest of the particular in-
fant that the Court should not, except in extreme cases interfere
with the discretion of the father but leave to him the responsibility
by exercising that power which nature has given by the birth of
the child.”1
In separate Broward cases, one deadbeat dad was found hiding
behind a shower curtain; another in a bedroom closet.
   In Daytona Beach, a helicopter and police canines helped track
down a father who had fled into woods behind his home when
authorities arrived. In Pensacola, one deadbeat dad eluded
authorities at his doorstep, only to be captured at the state tax of-
fice as he was trying to argue his way out of payments.
“We stalled him until the deputies came to arrest him,” [a Flor-
ida Department of Revenue spokeswoman] said. “He even tried to
run away as he was led out.”
. . . .
“The difference with this roundup is that it was statewide, and
merely the first in what will be many Florida-wide efforts,” [the
spokeswoman] said.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Society’s view of fathers has changed dramatically since the days
when courts rarely intervened between the father-child relationship.
The transformation can be traced to several sources, most notably
the Industrial Revolution, which required fathers to remove their la-
bor from the home to a remote facility.3 Mothers, viewed as physi-
cally and temperamentally weaker, were deemed incapable of
adapting to the rigorous demands of the workplace and were singu-
larly charged with the management of the domestic sphere.4 The
                                                                                                                   
1. LORNA MCKEE & MARGARET O’BRIEN EDS., THE FATHER FIGURE 28 (1982) (quot-
ing In Re Agar-Ellis, 24 Ch. D. 317 (1883) (England)).
2. David Beard, Statewide Sweep Jails Hundreds of Deadbeat Parents, FT. LAUD.
SUN SENT., Mar. 25, 1995, at B1.
3. See DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST
URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 12-18 (1995).
4. See Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women, in POVERTY LAW: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 28, 28-29 (Julie A. Nice & Louise G. Trubek eds., 1994).
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feminization of the homefront resulted in mothers replacing fathers
as the “primary and irreplaceable caregivers” in both “law and cus-
tom,” effectively leading to a “progressive loss of substance of the fa-
ther’s authority and a diminution of his power in the family and over
the family.”5 The stereotypical images of fathers as familial bread-
winners and mothers as domestic caretakers and primary childrear-
ers were born.6
With the reemergence of feminism in the early 1970s,7 many
women realized that they needed a man about as much as “a fish
needs a bicycle.”8 Justifiably, the male-female relationship was long
overdue for a reconfiguration. However, in the quest to throw off the
shackles that commonly constrained women in marriage, women, the
state, and society overlooked the reality that children needed—and
still need—the love and support of their fathers about as much as a
fish needs water.9 Only lately have we begun to understand that
children suffer serious negative consequences when fathers are mar-
ginalized.10
Despite continuous efforts from the feminist and fathers’ rights
movements to modify these stereotypical images, they still persist
                                                                                                                   
5. BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 13 (footnote omitted); see also ALLAN C. CARLSON,
FROM COTTAGE TO WORK STATION: THE FAMILY’S SEARCH FOR SOCIAL HARMONY IN THE
INDUSTRIAL AGE 4 (1993) (describing the “great divorce of labor from the home” as “one of
the defining factors in American domestic life since the 1840s”). This Comment in no way
suggests that fathers should have authoritarian power over the family today.
6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION: THE FATHER FACTOR
AND THE MOTHERHOOD MYSTIQUE 29 (1992).
7. In the United States, the women’s movement first emerged in the mid-nineteenth
century. See SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN
WOMEN 48 (1981) (discussing the 1848 Seneca Falls women’s rights convention, led by
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony). A societal backlash ensued that caused
the movement to subside until it was resurrected in the early 1910s as part of the suffrage
movement. See id. at 49. The National Woman’s Party organized in 1916, followed by a na-
tionwide Equal Rights Amendment campaign and calls for equal pay and better work con-
ditions. See id. Consciousness raising groups and birth control advocates also emerged,
women won the right to vote, and some states passed equal pay laws. See id. at 49-50.
However, before long, society, led by religious groups and the media, reared its oppressive
head and through the use of smear tactics and other tyrannical measures, succeeded in in-
stigating a sharp decline in the women’s rights movement. See id. The women’s rights
movement did not forcefully reemerge until the early 1970s. See id. at 55.
8. Linda Chavez, “I Want You:” Uncle Sam as Mr. Right?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 739, 741 (1996) (quoting Gloria Steinem).
9. See, e.g., JAMES A. LEVINE WITH EDWARD W. PITT, NEW EXPECTATIONS:
COMMUNITY STRATEGIES FOR RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD 26-27 (1995) (explaining that nur-
turing father-involvement during infancy dramatically improves a child’s cognitive, intel-
lectual, and social development throughout childhood); see also WARSHAK, supra note 6, at
46, 47 (noting that researchers have concluded that “the best way to predict who will be-
come an empathic adult is to measure the amount of time spent with the father while
growing up,” and that boys with fathers at home demonstrate higher levels of “moral ma-
turity”—understanding right versus wrong behavior—than boys from father-absent
homes); infra Part III.F.
10. See infra Part III.F.
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today.11 In no greater sphere do these outdated gender roles persist
than in our nation’s family court system.12 There, the state frequently
not only denies the capability and desire of many men to participate
actively and meaningfully in the care of their children,13 but also
perpetuates the subjugation of women as mothers by deeming them
weak and incapable of survival without the support of a man.14 This
state-instituted romantic paternalization of mothers, combined with
the narrowed view of the role of fathers, is largely responsible for the
wholesale destruction of the post-divorce, father-child relationship.15
Consequently, the state creates increased psychological, educational,
behavioral, and health disorders for children, and crime and violence
for society.16
Paradoxically, society maintains its insistence that it wants to
promote women’s independence by setting them free of the con-
straints of a bad marriage through state-sanctioned marital dissolu-
                                                                                                                   
11. See infra Parts III.B-F.
12. See infra text accompanying note 108 (noting that mothers receive primary resi-
dential custody of children approximately 90% of the time).
13. See infra note 108 and accompanying text; Part VI.
14. See, e.g., Anne P. Mitchell, Address at the 1995 Convention of the National Con-
gress of Fathers and Children (visited Mar. 19, 1998) <http://www.vix.com/free/testimony/
ncfcspeech.html> [hereinafter Mitchell Speech]. Ms. Mitchell noted that:
the vocal feminist front, in its current incarnation, has no desire for there to be
even a semblance of equality in this [family law] system, and is in fact coercing
today’s woman out of the workforce and back into the nursery.
. . . .
Of course, this can only mean that women must be primary caretakers, which
in turn means that men must be their financial benefactors.
Or, put more simply: women get the kids, men get to pay.
One would think, given the countless contemporary women who have proven
that women are in fact capable of sustaining a career as well as having chil-
dren, that to define women back into dependency on the very actors who have
for generations oppressed them, namely men and the state, would be nothing
short of heresy.
Id. Notably, Ms. Mitchell is a divorced, custodial mother. See Anne P. Mitchell, Testimony
Before the California Focus on Fathers Summit (visited Mar. 19, 1998) <http://www.vix.
com/free/testimony/summitapm.html> [hereinafter Mitchell Testimony].
15. See, e.g., Michael Stephens, Joint Custody, THE IRISH TIMES, July 25, 1996, at 13:
It is morally wrong that when . . . marriages end, the father’s role in the lives of
his children is reduced to such an extent that he becomes, at best, an avuncular
figure on the periphery of his family. The destruction of the father/children re-
lationship does not only apply in exceptional circumstances, but is standard
practice when custody disputes are referred to courts for settlement.
Not only must divorced fathers frequently contend with state-induced parental alienation,
but some are also confronted with parental alienation spurred by the child’s mother. See
Michael R. Walsh & J. Michael Bone, Parental Alienation Syndrome: An Age Old Custody
Problem, FLA. B.J., June 1997, at 93 (describing parental alienation syndrome, first identi-
fied by Richard A. Gardner, as one parent “brainwashing” the child to reject the other par-
ent); see, e.g., Justin Catanoso, Visitation Case Raises Questions About Child Rights,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., July 13, 1997, at A1 (noting that the child psychologist found
that the mother influenced the fourteen-year-old child into rejecting her father).
16. See THE NATIONAL FATHERHOOD INITIATIVE, FATHER FACTS (1995) [hereinafter
FATHER FACTS]; infra Part III.F.
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tion,17 while at the same time operating a system that expects, per-
mits, and maintains the outdated role of women as the weaker and
dependent sex, primarily responsible for caregiving and incapable of
economic self-sufficiency.18
The state’s treatment of divorced fathers has become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. By sending a distinct message to divorced fathers
that they are not essential to the raising of children beyond supply-
ing a percentage of their paychecks to the mother of their children,
and perhaps a couple of hours a week of “visitation” with their chil-
dren, the state has encouraged divorced fathers to abandon true fa-
therhood.19 Yet, society looks on with bewilderment and disdain when
divorced fathers fade from a meaningful relationship with their chil-
dren.20 No one should be surprised that the situation has been re-
duced to cornering some non-custodial fathers behind shower cur-
tains and chasing them with police dogs and helicopters.21
Part II of this Comment traces the origin of gender stereotypes
and their incorporation into family law. Part III disputes recent
studies used to argue that courts do not favor mothers over fathers in
deciding child custody. It also examines current gender-based cul-
tural stereotypes and the state’s continued overwhelming placement
of children with mothers when awarding primary residential cus-
tody, often despite statutes specifically requiring equal consideration
of both parents when making custody determinations. Part IV pro-
vides an overview of the Fourteenth Amendment, especially regard-
                                                                                                                   
17. See FALUDI, supra note 7, at 26 (“[I]n national surveys, less than a third of di-
vorced men say [they sought] divorce, while women report they . . . actively [sought] di-
vorce 55 to 66 percent of the time.”).
18. See Mitchell Speech, supra note 14.
19. See Mitchell Testimony, supra note 14; Testimony of Cynthia L. Ewing, Senior
Policy Analyst, Children’s Rights Council, Before the U.S. House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources (Feb. 6, 1995),
<http://www.peak.org/~jedwards/crc.htm> [hereinafter Ewing Testimony]:
First, as a direct result of our country’s archaic child custody laws, judicial
practices and bureaucratic policies, millions of fit, loving, and dedicated parents
have been literally pushed away from their children. The misguided notion that
upon divorce or separation of their parents, children need only ONE parent,
permeates our country’s judiciary, legislative bodies and social service agencies.
Because of this attitude, we typically assign complete ownership and control of
these children to ONE parent – the custodial parent. We relegate the OTHER
parent, regardless of his/her fitness or demonstrated history of responsibility,
to the status of “visitor” and “non-custodian,” whose primary function is to send
money. The first disincentive to being a financially responsible parent is pro-
vided at the onset of this process. Stripping a parent of his/her parental rights,
referring to him/her in denigrating terms, and treating him/her as only a finan-
cial resource is a highly effective DEMOTIVATOR! Congress must recognize
that parental rights and responsibilities go hand in hand and that any policy it
formulates or supports which diminishes the role of either parent will be coun-
terproductive to its child support and child welfare initiatives.
20. See Mitchell Testimony, supra note 14.
21. See Beard, supra note 2.
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ing parent-child relationships, and Part V reviews Florida’s child
custody statute. Part VI reviews cases brought by fathers claiming
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part VII discusses chal-
lenges to the practice of predominantly awarding mothers primary
residential custody of children, and whether the practice violates a
father’s constitutional right to equal consideration as the primary
residential custodian, his equally fundamental right to raise his chil-
dren, and his protected right to a fundamentally fair hearing. Part
VIII recommends solutions to genuinely provide for the best interests
of children in the post-divorce state by rectifying the disparate
treatment of fathers in family court, and of mothers in the work-
place. This Comment concludes that in the best interests of children,
courts must truly consider both parents equally when making cus-
tody determinations, and should seek to maximize the active and
substantial involvement of both fits parents in the lives of their chil-
dren.
II.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN GENDER STEREOTYPES AS
APPLIED TO MOTHER-FATHER ROLES
Men, more than women, are culture-made. Fatherhood, in par-
ticular, is . . . a “metaphysical idea”—an imperfect cultural im-
provisation designed not to express maleness but to socialize it. It
derives less from sexual embodiment than from a social impera-
tive: the need to obligate men to their offspring. Consequently,
ideas about masculinity and fatherhood are inextricably rooted in
social functions.22
A.   From Colonial America to the Civil War
The newly forming American society imported English practices
regarding marriage and children, giving fathers an “absolute right to
custody.”23 As part of the marriage contract, women were legally
deemed the property of men.24 “As Blackstone put it, when a man and
a woman married they acquired a ‘unity of person.’ This ‘unity’ was
interpreted to provide the husband with extensive rights to his wife’s
property, and to deny the married woman the power to contract or
engage in litigation.”25 In exchange for denying women personal
                                                                                                                   
22. BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 17.
23. JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, A BRIEF HISTORY OF FAMILY LAW IN FLORIDA AND THE
UNITED STATES: INSIGHTS REGARDING AN ATTEMPT TO SIMPLIFY DIVORCE PROCEDURES 60
(1995) (on file with author).
24. See Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and Ra-
tionales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape & Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 86 (1994).
25. STERNLIGHT, supra note 23, at 59 (citations omitted).
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rights, women were provided with “male protection” and financial
support.26
The patriarchal American society mirrored the English practice of
designating the father as the natural protector of children because he
had the ability to provide for their financial support.27 Women were
seen as incapable of handling legal or financial matters and were be-
lieved to lack the necessary sophistication and skill with which to
properly school children in practical, worldly matters.28 American
courts adopted these perceptions; thus, in the rare divorce case, fa-
thers were awarded custody of children.29 Courts, during a time when
the culture was agrarian and children worked in the fields, upheld
this action by finding that the father’s financial support of his chil-
dren entitled him to the benefits of their labor.30 Thus, in the ex-
tremely rare circumstance that a father did not receive custody, he
was not required to financially support his children because he would
not benefit from their labor.31
By the mid-1800s, society began to perceive children as needing
special consideration and treatment.32 In furtherance of this percep-
tion, Congress implemented the Talfourd Act of 183933 to legislate
the presumption that courts should award custody of children under
age seven to the mother.34 This presumption became known as the
“tender-years doctrine,” which legalized for the first time the belief
that mothers were better suited to raise children than fathers.35
Courts interpreted the Talfourd Act to be a temporary guideline, and
many children were returned to their father’s custody once they
reached the age of four or five.36 The Talfourd Act, and the belief that
fathers should ultimately have custody of their children, prevailed in
family courts throughout the mid-1800s.
By the late 1800s, fathers began working in droves away from the
home in the factories and plants of the Industrial Revolution.37 This
unprecedented and significant change facilitated a changed cultural
                                                                                                                   
26. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 28-29.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 13.
30. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 29; Dorothy Miller, Women and Social Welfare, in
POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 358, 359 (Julie A. Nice & Louise G. Trubek eds.,
1994).
31. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 29.
32. See Carol Sanger, Separating From Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 402-04
(1996); WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 29.
33. 2 & 3 Vict. Stat., ch. 54 (1839).
34. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 29.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 31 (“Fathers were increasingly employed away from home. And mothers
could no longer participate in the material support of the family while staying at home, as
in preindustrial times.”); see also Abramovitz, supra note 4, at 28-29.
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expectation of the role of fathers. Developing family law followed
suit.
B.   The Industrial Revolution
Post-Civil War America ushered in the age of the Industrial
Revolution and showed the door to the agrarian culture. Because fa-
thers usually provided the family’s sole income through their em-
ployment away from the home, this absence advanced the fathers’
“long march from the center to the periphery of domestic life.”38
Simultaneously, mothers were charged with the role of chief child
caretakers and home managers largely because of their cultural and
legal exclusion from the workplace.39 Although society sentimental-
ized motherhood, the task was nonetheless arduous, as “[m]others
bore the weight of this exhausting assignment. The project required
them to ‘maintain a constant moral vigilance over their progeny from
infancy until that critical period when, in early adulthood, they left
the parental home.’ Moreover, maternal satisfaction in the enterprise
was not part of the calculation.”40 Ministers, politicians, journalists,
and popular culture warned mothers of the consequences of failing to
put children first: “The care of children requires a great many sacri-
fices, and a great deal of self-denial, but the woman who is not will-
ing to sacrifice a good deal in such a cause, does not deserve to be a
mother.”41 Thus, the mother was seen as “[p]ious, inferior, subordi-
nate, and confined to the home . . . . The terms of women’s role in the
new industrial family ethic elevated marriage, motherhood, home-
making, and the overseeing of family life to new ideological
heights.”42
Experts believe that while no absolute reason can be pinpointed
as the cause of the shift toward an indelible preference for mother-
custody, the Industrial Revolution figured prominently in this trans-
formation.43 Requiring fathers to work away from the home ensured
the diminution of their role in the family. As the family unit experi-
enced physical separation like never before, the role of fathers as pro-
tectors and guides for their children began to diminish.44 This cul-
                                                                                                                   
38. BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 14 (noting that child rearing manuals, which had
previously been addressed primarily to fathers, now addressed mothers and lamented the
decreasing role of the father in the family unit).
39. See Abramovitz, supra note 4, at 29.
40. Sanger, supra note 32, at 401 (footnote omitted).
41. Id.
42. Abramovitz, supra note 4, at 31 (noting that this expectation applied only to upper
and middle class women; poor and minority women were not expected to remain in the
home, but instead worked due to necessity, many as domestics in the homes of more finan-
cially secure white women); see also Sanger, supra note 32, at 389.
43. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 30.
44. See id. at 31.
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tural change, coupled with decades of the tender years doctrine, re-
sulted in an upward extension of the age of “tender years.”45 Eventu-
ally, “the tender-years presumption became the rationale for award-
ing custody of children of all ages to the mother on a permanent ba-
sis.”46
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “the legal
pendulum swung away from fathers” in custody cases.47 Moreover, a
cultural reverence for motherhood began creeping into judicial opin-
ions in child custody disputes. The Washington Supreme Court ob-
served in 1916:
Mother love is a dominant trait in even the weakest of women, and
as a general thing surpasses the paternal affection for the common
offspring, and moreover, a child needs a mother’s care even more
than a father’s. For these reasons courts are loathe to deprive the
mother of the custody of her children, and will not do so unless it
be shown clearly that she is so far an unfit and improper person to
be intrusted with such custody as to endanger the welfare of the
children.48
In 1918, the North Dakota Supreme Court found motherhood to
be “the most sacred ties of nature” and declined to disrupt those ties
by awarding a father custody only “in extreme cases.”49
A dissenting justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court was so
taken aback by a now-unusual award of custody to the father that he
wrote:
The natural mother love of a mother for her child is such, in my
opinion, that no other person on earth can administer to the care
and welfare of her child the same as she can and would. There is
peculiarly no limit to the love and affection of a mother for her
child; and I believe that, even though she be handicapped with
poverty and human weaknesses, her care and protection of her off-
spring is more naturally efficient than that of any other person
who might be more fortunately situated and endowed. It is harsh
and cruel to forcibly separate a mother from her child, and it
should not be done, in my judgment, except in certain cases, where
there can be no reasonable doubt that the welfare of the child re-
quires such separation.50
Such strong societally created sentiments convinced many fathers
to forego custody challenges.51 Furthermore, the inception of child la-
bor laws provided a disincentive for some fathers to seek custody be-
                                                                                                                   
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Freeland v. Freeland, 159 P. 698, 699 (Wash. 1916).
49. Random v. Random, 170 N.W. 313, 314 (N.D. 1918).
50. Duncan v. Duncan, 80 So. 697, 703 (Miss. 1919) (Holden, J., dissenting).
51. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 32.
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cause children could not provide income to their father to compensate
for childrearing costs.52
Thus, in but a few generations and driven largely by cultural and
economic determinations of male and female roles, custody of Amer-
ica’s children when their parents divorced changed from decisions
based on oppressive economic realities to ones based on oppressive
social mythologies. As America continued into the twentieth century,
the reverence for motherhood over fatherhood deepened.
C.   The 1920s to the 1970s
Along with a fundamental modification of the economic structure
and a consequential change in the location where fathers performed
their labor, the Industrial Age ushered in an integral transformation
in the way mothers and fathers viewed themselves, and how society
viewed them. Prior to the Industrial Age, men primarily received
self-validation through the successful raising of skilled, morally
sound children.53 The transition to non-agrarian work encouraged
men to seek external validation to confirm their maleness.54 By the
1920s, economic ambition and professional achievement replaced ef-
fective fatherhood as the correct yardsticks by which to measure a
good father.55 Consequently, fathers toiled in remote locations not
only to support their families but to receive societal validation as
good fathers.56 Woe to the father who was incapable of financially
supporting his family, because he would be deemed a failure not only
as a father, but as a man.57 While society permitted fathers economic
independence, it ensured that divorce courts stereotypically viewed
fathers as devoid of ability and interest in actively raising children,
thereby handicapping men in custody considerations and depriving
children of meaningful relationships with their fathers.58
While men were programmed to equate their external economic
productivity with their maleness and value as fathers, middle class
women were programmed by society to accept subservient roles and,
to be viewed as good mothers, to stay at home to care for their chil-
dren.59 Devoting one’s life to childrearing ensured external societal
                                                                                                                   
52. See id. at 30.
53. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 15.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See FALUDI, supra note 7, at 52. The only period prior to the 1970s during which
women were told by society that they could work while simultaneously having a family oc-
curred during World War II, when women were needed in the workplace. See id. After the
war, the media bombarded women with the message that careers were “unattractive” and
good mothers remained at home. See id. Society ensured that women chose childrearing
over work by valuing female-identified employment (e.g., teaching, secretarial, nursing,
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validation and, subsequently, personal confirmation of female self-
identity.60 Consequently, although women were denied economic in-
dependence in the work force, they held greater leverage in custodial
decisions,61 resulting in financial awards in the form of child support
to ensure that they remained out of the employment arena. While ef-
fective fatherhood ceased to be an indicator of the validity of one’s
maleness, effective motherhood continued to serve as the standard by
which a woman’s worth was measured.62 Woe to the mother who did
not choose to selflessly and altruistically place her children above all
else, for she would be deemed a failure as a mother, and as a
woman.63
These societally imposed roles ensured the continued economic
subjugation of women by requiring their dependence on men for eco-
nomic survival, following divorce in the forms of alimony and child
support, as social etiquette demanded that mothers not work.64
Courts promoted society’s prescribed stereotype of the women who
did work as weak and in need of state-instituted protection by up-
holding workplace legislation designed to restrict women from
working beyond a certain amount of hours, frequently in industries
deemed unhealthy to their alleged gentler constitutions, or from
working in particular jobs.65 In custody decisions, courts continued to
                                                                                                                   
and child care positions) less than male-identified jobs through the assignment of lower
wages. See Teresa L. Amott & Julie A. Matthaei, The Transformation of Women’s Wage
Work, in POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 304, 306-09, 322-24 (Julie A. Nice & Louise
G. Trubek eds., 1994).
60. See Abramovitz, supra note 4, at 31.
61. See WARREN FARRELL, THE MYTH OF MALE POWER 46 (1993) (noting that “dis-
crimination in favor of men at work meant discrimination in favor of their wives at home”).
62. Significantly, however, effective maternity was seen as less valuable than mate-
rial-based successes such as those obtainable only through access to the workplace, and
therefore only available to males. See id.
63. See Abramovitz, supra note 4, at 31.
64. See id. The contemporary cultural subjugation of women as home-bound chil-
drearers—whether or not they want that role—is illustrated by the deliberate closure of a
church-run child care facility in Berryville, Arkansas:
In a letter that followed [the announcement of the closure], the church said that
while it was sensitive to the plight of single parents, it could not continue the
center because its existence encouraged mothers to work outside the home.
“God intended for the home to be the center of a mother’s world,” the church
said. “In Titus 2:5, women are instructed to be ‘discreet, chaste, keepers at
home, good and obedient to their own husbands . . . .’”
Paisley Dodds, Day Care Closes to Keep Moms at Home, TALL. DEM., Apr. 5, 1997, at A3.
65. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 417 (1908) (challenging an Oregon stat-
ute that forbid the employment of women in any mechanical establishment, factory, or
laundry for more than 10 hours per day). The Court stated:
[t]hat woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is
especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they
are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long
time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious ef-
fects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring,
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promote the image of the mother as venerated and worthy of senti-
mental safeguarding. Mothers were called “God’s own institution for
the rearing and upbringing of the child.”66 One court beamed:
[I]n her alone is duty swallowed up in desire; in her alone is serv-
ice expressed in terms of love. She alone has the patience and
sympathy required to mold and soothe the infant mind in its ad-
justment to its environment. The difference between fatherhood
and motherhood in this respect is fundamental . . . .67
One court went so far as to poeticize the mother-child relationship by
noting that “[t]here is but a twilight zone between a mother’s love
and the atmosphere of heaven.”68
By implementing stereotypical ideals of women into their deci-
sions, courts furthered “romantic paternalism”69 and the “motherhood
mystique.”70 Consequently, by the 1920s, mother-custody preference
was firmly rooted in the family court system.71
In furtherance of these ideals, psychological studies were con-
ducted that purportedly legitimized the special role of the mother in
custody decisions.72 The father’s role was not similarly examined, and
                                                                                                                   
the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care
in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
Id. at 421. During the same era, the Supreme Court struck down similar legislation de-
signed primarily to protect men. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking
down a New York law capping bakery employee work hours at 60 per week as inconsistent
with the liberty to contract).
66. Hines v. Hines, 185 N.W. 91, 92 (Iowa 1921).
67. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 181 N.W. 826, 827 (Wis. 1921).
68. Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
69. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (“[Sex discrimination] was ra-
tionalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women,
not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”).
70. WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 36 (defining the mystique in terms similar to romantic
paternalism).
71. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 68.
72. See id. at 19. A prime example is a 1951 study commissioned by the World Health
Organization and conducted by John Bowlby, a preeminent psychoanalyst. Bowlby set up a
study to follow the effects of maternal deprivation. Paternal deprivation was not studied.
Yet, Bowlby felt confident enough to report that “the child’s relation to his mother . . . is
without doubt in ordinary circumstances, by far his most important relationship.” Bowlby’s
findings were widely implemented by child care institutions and reinforced court findings
that children should be kept with mothers at all costs. Consequently, to reduce the toddler-
mother “separation anxiety” as reported by Bowlby, psychologists recommended that fa-
thers be denied overnight visitation. Studies such as these have been incorporated into our
family court system and have become unquestioned aspects of our family law. See
WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 35-36; see also Martha J. Cox & Blair Paley, Families as Sys-
tems, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 243, 244 (1997) (noting that child development studies have
focused on the role of the mother-child relationship); infra text accompanying note 162
(noting that as late as 1996, the guidelines in Florida’s Twelfth Judicial Circuit provided
that a noncustodial parent—almost always the father—could not have overnight visitation
with a child until the child turned two years old).
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thus the definition of fatherhood became diffused and unspecified.73
With greater attention focused on the stereotypical role of mothers,
and less attention on fathers, fathers became even more culturally
unimportant and relegated to an insignificant and secondary role in
the family unit.74
Eventually, the tender years doctrine was replaced by the “best
interests of the child” standard.75 This standard purported to focus
attention away from the gender attributes of the parents and toward
the custody situation deemed best for the child. In application, how-
ever, there was little difference in the two standards because of the
comparatively low expectations regarding the role of fathers in child
rearing and the nearly fanatical mythologies surrounding women’s
roles in child care. This result should not have been surprising: a test
focusing on a child’s “best” interests is an inherently subjective test
that will naturally include, both consciously and subconsciously, a
judge’s understanding of the contemporary culture’s determination of
“best.”76 For example, while stating that the “welfare of the children
is the controlling consideration” in custody litigation, the Florida Su-
preme Court in 1945 held that “[o]rdinarily, in the case of children of
tender years such welfare is not best promoted . . . by taking them
from the mother, unless it be shown that she is not a fit and proper
person to have them.”77 Thus, the “best interests of the children”
standard continued to assume it was best for young children to re-
main with their mothers upon divorce.
Another cultural perversion of the best interests standard arose
from the “all things being equal” standard. Courts faced with equally
skilled and loving parents continued to firmly apply the motherhood
                                                                                                                   
73. See LEONARD BENSON, FATHERHOOD: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 12 (1968)
(“Father is not a very impressive figure in American life, and, in slighting him, American
social theorists may simply confirm the fact that the behavioral sciences can be influenced
by cultural predispositions.”).
74. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 19.
75. See, e.g., Green v. Green, 137 Fla. 359, 361, 188 So. 355, 356 (1939) (“We are
committed to the doctrine that the welfare of the child is the principal feature in deter-
mining custody, and that a very large discretion is allowed the chancellor in this respect.”).
The Green court added that “[n]ature has prepared a mother to bear and rear her young
and to perform many services for them and to give them many attentions for which the fa-
ther is not equipped.” See id., 188 So. at 356.
76. See, e.g., Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children’s Per-
spectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 56 (1994) (“Absent some empirical basis for a
‘best interests’ determination, after all, the court’s decision must manifest little more than
idiosyncratic and subjective conclusions about what living arrangements are ‘best’ for chil-
dren.”).
77. Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 527, 23 So. 2d 623, 625 (1945) (citations omitted).
This concept still exists in Florida’s family court system today; Florida’s Fifth District
Court of Appeal recently noted that “there remains a temptation for many judges to con-
sider the right to custody as the mother’s to lose and unless her fitness is legitimately
challenged, the father’s right of equal consideration is often ignored.” Ayyash v. Ayyash,
700 So. 2d 752, 754 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
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mystique to custody decisions. For example, while giving lip service
to the best interests of the children, the Alabama Supreme Court in
1930 concluded: “Other things being equal, this court by numerous
precedents holds the mother of infants of tender years best fitted to
bestow the motherly affection, care, companionship, and early train-
ing suited to their needs.”78
Ironically, while courts devalued the importance of fathers upon
divorce—or followed the cultural devaluation of them—some social
policies recognized the critical importance of fathers. In the early
years of World War II, for example, fathers were the last men to be
conscripted for military service.79 Moreover, early television pro-
grams portrayed the father as—in addition to out of the home during
the day—omniscient.80 A cultural schizophrenia of fatherhood devel-
oped: married fathers were revered even though they were mostly
absent and disengaged from meaningful childrearing while finan-
cially supporting the family; unmarried fathers, however, were posi-
tively disposable.81 That stereotype invaded the family court system,
and continues today.
D.   The 1970s to the 1990s
The 1970s phase of the women’s movement is generally credited
with bringing feminist ideals to the forefront of the American cul-
ture.82 As women increased their consciousness of feminist issues, the
attendant change in traditional mother roles forced many fathers to
reevaluate their positions within the family. Many women decided
that they would rather work outside the home than perform domestic
labor that forced them to be financially dependent on their hus-
bands.83 Simultaneously, many women were forced into the work-
place due to a change in household economics caused by “the collapse
of the fathers’ ability to support their families solely on their earn-
                                                                                                                   
78. Gayle v. Gayle, 125 So. 638, 639 (Ala. 1930). Note how the traits of “affection,
care, companionship, and early training” were defined as “motherly.”
79. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 51. Fathers with children born on or before
the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, were not conscripted into military serv-
ice. The ban lasted until October 1943, when the requirement for more troops carried the
day over father deferments. Even then, however, fathers were treated special, as the direc-
tor of the Selective Service promised to order local draft boards to “‘first exhaust the pool of
available unmarried men, and next the pool of married men without children, before fa-
thers would be called.’” Id. at 50-52 (citation omitted).
80. Television programs such as The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet, Father Knows
Best, and Leave It to Beaver are prime examples.
81. For an excellent overview on the special custodial issues of unwed fathers, see
Toni L. Craig, Establishing the Biological Rights Doctrine to Protect Unwed Fathers in
Contested Adoptions, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 391 (1998).
82. See FALUDI, supra note 7, at 55.
83. See id. at 53; ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA 222 (1993).
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ings.”84 As women began to free themselves from stereotypical, sec-
ondary, and dependent roles within the family economic structure—
whether because of family economics or feminism85—men increas-
ingly found themselves judicially “liberated” from the family as
women sought divorce in record numbers.86 This increase in divorce
promoted the marginalization of fathers far more extensively than
the Industrial Revolution because divorce literally severed the father
from the home on a permanent basis. Many fathers resigned them-
selves to continuing their role primarily as financial providers for
their children and their now ex-wives, and adjusted to seeing their
children approximately four days each month.87
Confronted with the realization that it was very difficult to bal-
ance work with parenting, some still-married mothers demanded
that fathers share more substantively in child care.88 The National
Organization for Women (NOW) issued a press release that stated
child care was not singularly a maternal responsibility.89 However,
this call for sharing parental responsibility did not always include
divorced fathers, as a national study indicated that 40% of custodial
mothers admitted that they had refused to allow fathers to exercise
visitation as a retributive measure, while 20% believed that fathers
should be totally cut out of the lives of their children and sought to
achieve such an end.90 Rarely did courts intervene to enforce visita-
tion.91
Because they were excised from their roles as family breadwin-
ners and “heads of households,” many fathers were forced to seek a
                                                                                                                   
84. GRISWOLD, supra note 83, at 222.
85. See id. at 237, 245 (“Changes in the household economy and the reemergence of
feminism have been the two most critical forces changing fatherhood.”).
86. See FALUDI, supra note 7, at 97.
87. Every other weekend visitation arrangements were—and remain—fairly common.
See, e.g., Russenberger v. Russenberger, 654 So. 2d 207, 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), aff’d  669
So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1996) (upholding the imposition of a “liberal and reasonable” visitation
schedule of every other weekend, noting that such arrangement was the lower court’s
“standard visitation schedule”).
88. See GRISWOLD, supra note 83, at 245.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 262.
91. Responding to visitation interference problems, the Florida Legislature enacted
the Visitation Rights Enforcement Act of 1996, providing judges various discretionary op-
tions to enforce improperly denied court-ordered visitation and requiring them to order
make-up visitation. See Visitation Rights Enforcement Act of 1996, ch. 96-183, § 5, 1996
Fla. Laws 454, 456 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.13(4)(c) (1997)). The Legislature intended
that the law:
(b) Discourage custodial parents from improperly denying court-ordered visita-
tion and . . . encourage such custodial parents to allow the noncustodial parent
or grandparents to make up any visitation which has been denied, without
court intervention.
(c) Indicate the clear intent that the Legislature does not support the power of a
custodial parent to improperly deny court-ordered visitation.
Id. at § 2(1)(b)-(c), 1996 Fla. Laws at 454.
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redefinition of self-identity. Fathers struggled to understand the so-
cietal message that they were still perceived as providers yet without
the full-time family and attendant benefits. Frustrated and confused
by state relegation to an even-more-undefined existence, some di-
vorced fathers instead chose to cut off all contact with their children
rather than deal with the pain of being alienated from them.92 Like
women before them, some formed support groups to deal with the
bitterness and anger, and to analyze mixed cultural messages of
what their proper roles were to be.93 Many decided that the tradi-
tional father roles taught to them by their fathers were no longer
valid in an era of rampant divorce. Some realized that society, par-
ticularly divorce courts, nonetheless compelled them to remain in the
outdated role as aloof financial caretakers, and they began to ques-
tion and confront this gender bias.
III.   THE END RESULT: CULTURAL GENDER STEREOTYPES AND
MOTHER-FATHER ROLES TODAY
As the twentieth century concludes, this country seems no closer
to resolving child custody issues free of gender bias than it did in the
days of the 1800s when fathers automatically received custody. De-
spite more than 150 years of evidence that custody decisions have
been based largely on prevailing social and cultural roles and man-
dates for men and women, child custody in America today continues
to be decided with only lip service to the holistic needs of children.
Unfortunately, the child custody debate is hampered by a second
layer of gender bias: gender-biased, results-oriented studies. Rather
than contributing to the debate about how best to provide for chil-
dren of divorce or never-married parents, these studies seek to pre-
serve the status quo by denying the existence of gender bias in the
first place or finding that gender bias in family courts is a uniquely
female dilemma.
A.   Lenore Weitzman and the “73% Study”
The classic example of such a study is the now-discredited work of
sociologist Lenore Weitzman.94 In 1985, Weitzman, reported that
women suffered a 73% drop in their standard of living following di-
vorce while men experienced a 42% increase in theirs.95 Her findings
were trumpeted in the news media and various publications as proof
that divorce laws actually favored men and that more economic pro-
                                                                                                                   
92. See GRISWOLD, supra note 83, at 268.
93. See id. at 261-62.
94. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985).
95. See FALUDI, supra note 7, at 20.
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tections had to be given to women of divorce.96 The problem was that
Weitzman’s numbers were woefully inaccurate, a conclusion shared
by independent researchers, feminist researchers, and, eventually,
even Weitzman herself.
For example, as recounted by feminist author Susan Faludi, Weitz-
man purported to base her study on a methodology advanced by Saul
Hoffman, an economist at the University of Delaware, and Greg
Duncan, a social scientist.97 Upon learning of Weitzman’s claims,
Hoffman and Duncan attempted to contact her to discuss the dis-
crepancies in their own findings that, using the same methodology,
post-divorce women suffered a much smaller and temporary decline
in their standard of living of 30%.98 The two also found that divorced
women’s standards of living actually rose within five years to a figure
higher than that obtained while married to their former husbands.99
After sidestepping Hoffman and Duncan for more than four years,
Weitzman finally supplied her data to them, but the data were disor-
ganized and unreviewable.100
Accordingly, Hoffman and Duncan ran the data supplied by
Weitzman in her book, and they still received a figure closer to their
much lower number.101 When they published their findings demon-
strating that the Weitzman figures were “almost certainly in error,”
“suspiciously large,” and inconsistent with her own information, this
news was hardly reported by the news media at all.102 Even as late as
1996, despite the study’s refutation, the erroneous figures were still
being incorporated into public policy.103
The U.S. Census Bureau later confirmed in a study that Weitz-
man’s 73% number was wrong and inconsistent with her own infor-
mation.104 Eventually, Weitzman herself acknowledged her study was
erroneous.105
Yet the damage was done. Many policy makers and judges failed
to recognize the clear error of Weitzman’s work and conclusions; this
failure, in retrospect, made sense: her study told them what they
wanted to hear. She confirmed the prevailing cultural bias that
                                                                                                                   
96. See id. at 19-20; Associated Press, Huge Gap Reported in Post-Divorce Standard of
Living a Mistake  (May 16, 1996) <http://www2.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/nation/051696/
nation2_5387.html> (noting references to the study in 175 news stories, 348 social science
articles, 250 law review articles, 24 appeals courts and Supreme Court cases, and even in
President Clinton’s 1996 budget) [hereinafter Huge Gap Mistake].
97. See FALUDI, supra note 7, at 21.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 22.
102. Id.
103. See Huge Gap Mistake, supra note 96.
104. See FALUDI, supra note 7, at 22.
105. See Huge Gap Mistake, supra note 96.
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women were the “weaker sex” and, accordingly, in need of paternalis-
tic government intervention and protection. She also confirmed the
prevailing cultural bias that men did not need such protection. This
attitude, demonstrated here in economic considerations, likewise
prevails in custody considerations. A 1989 study conducted by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which incorporated some of
Weitzman’s findings, is a prime example.
B.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Gender Bias Study
of the Court System in Massachusetts
Although allegedly implemented “to determine the extent, nature,
and consequences of gender bias in the judiciary and to make reme-
dial recommendations to promote the fair and equal treatment of
men and women,”106 the 1989 Gender Bias Study of the Court System
in Massachusetts is a prime example of a results-oriented study
ironically reeking of gender bias.107 Despite evidence demonstrating
that mothers receive primary residential custody of children ap-
proximately 90% of the time that custody is first determined by the
court,108 this study offered the following remarkable conclusion to
demonstrate that gender bias against fathers in child custody deter-
minations was a myth, unworthy of further study or policy changes:
“[F]athers who actively seek custody obtain either primary or joint
physical custody over 70% of the time.”109 This conclusion is often
cited to discredit continuing claims by fathers and fathers’ rights or-
ganizations of gender bias in child custody matters.110 An analysis of
                                                                                                                   
106. MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT
SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS (1989), reprinted in 24 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 745, 745 (1990)
[hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS STUDY].
107. See, e.g., id. at 746 (noting that “women face discriminatory attitudes and actions”
regarding child custody, but failing to recognize that men face discriminatory attitudes and
actions regarding child custody); id. at 748, 830 (reporting that “perceptions of gender bias
may discourage fathers from seeking custody and stereotypes about fathers may some-
times affect case outcomes,” but failing to examine either the perceptions or the stereo-
types and how they affect fathers so that, by their own data, 93.4% of the time mothers re-
ceive primary residential custody); id. at 829 (suggesting that it is appropriate for mothers
to overwhelmingly receive custody because of, in part, “the unequal sacrifice of earning po-
tential these women make in order to be primary caretakers,” yet failing to examine gen-
der bias against men who are culturally forced into the “provider” role).
108. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S10896-01 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988); DEBORAH L. RHODE,
JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 155-56 (1989); Stephen J. Bahr
et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of Maternal Preference Made a
Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 255 (1994) (“Some have argued that the number of fathers
gaining sole custody has increased in recent years but these data indicate that only a small
percentage of fathers are awarded sole custody while mothers continue to be awarded sole
custody in a large majority of custody cases.” (footnote omitted)).
109. MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 106, at 830.
110. See Krista Carpenter, Comment, Why Are Mothers Still Losing: An Analysis of
Gender Bias in Child Custody Determinations, 1996 DET. C. L. REV. 33, 41 (1996) (noting
that fathers “are successful seventy percent of the time” when they seek custody); see also
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the methodology underlying this conclusion, however, demonstrates
fundamental flaws that seem to confirm a results-oriented analy-
sis.111
First, the study s methodology in the area of child custody was en-
tirely subjective; that is, it was based on interviews rather than hard
data from court files.112 Second, the study dodged the hard questions
of gender bias it purported to address. For example:
In most cases, mothers get primary physical custody of children
following divorce. In general, this pattern does not reflect judicial
gender bias, but the agreement of the parties and the fact that in
most families mothers have been the primary caretakers of chil-
dren. In some cases, however, perceptions of gender bias may dis-
courage fathers from seeking custody, and stereotypes about fa-
thers may affect case outcomes.113
                                                                                                                   
Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody Disputes: When One Parent Abuses the
Other, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Apr. 1996, at 1113, 1117 (“Despite men’s claims that fathers
are discriminated against in custody disputes, in actuality fathers who fight for custody in
America win sole or at least joint custody in 70 percent of these contests.” (Note how the
receipt of joint custody is referred to as a “win” for fathers.))
111. This conclusion of a flawed analysis should not be surprising, given the studys
statement of motivations on this issue: “Our work in the subcommittee studying family law
issues was motivated in part by the growing statistical evidence that women suffer tre-
mendous negative economic consequences following the dissolution of a marriage.”
MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 106, at 762 (citing, in part, the Weitzman study, dis-
cussed supra in Part III.A). From this premise sprang the following results-oriented ex-
aminations:
While committee members realize that the negative consequences of divorce
are felt by both husband and wife, the task before the Committee was to ex-
amine whether the consequences of divorce have a disproportionately negative
impact on either men or women. Members of the Subcommittee on Gender and
Economics examined court practices regarding custody, child support, alimony,
and property division to isolate patterns of behavior that disadvantage women
and to examine the results of this behavior on the economic status of women.
Id. at 763 (first emphasis in original; others added).
Lacking from the study was any objective analysis to determine whether the fundamen-
tal premise of women suffering “tremendous negative economic consequences” from divorce
was true. Also lacking was any objective analysis to isolate patterns of behavior that dis-
advantaged men regarding their roles with and access to their children.
112. The study reported sending surveys to family law attorneys, general attorneys,
and probate judges. See id. at 826. The study also convened focus groups, took testimony,
and interviewed attorneys. See id. In other words, in an effort to confirm or refute anecdo-
tal evidence that fathers suffered gender bias in family courts regarding child custody de-
terminations, the study sought and compiled only more anecdotal evidence.
113. Id. at 825. In a statement remarkable for its lack of objective or follow-up analy-
sis, the study reported, in a footnote, that “[d]espite the absence of statutory or decisional
authority for a maternal preference for children of tender years, it is possible that in prac-
tice, judges exercised such a preference (Pearson and Handler, 1987).” Id. at 827 n.47.
Elsewhere, the study stated that nearly a quarter of family law attorneys reported that
sometimes or often where custodial mothers worked outside of the home a change of cus-
tody was “granted to fathers who remarry women who are home full time.” Id. at 833. This
latter result was seen as gender bias against mothers by holding them to different and
higher standards than fathers. See id. at 832. Incredibly, the result was not seen as gender
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Clearly the study missed an opportunity to explore whether out-of-
court gender bias led to situations in which mothers were predomi-
nantly the primary caretakers, the stated basis for mothers’ success
in court.114 It did not look at the forces at play underlying “the
agreement of the parties” regarding custody.115 Most problematic,
however, was its total absence of follow up on the speculation of how
gender bias discouraged fathers from seeking custody and how
stereotypes about fathers affected outcomes.
Thus, ignoring these potential gender biases against fathers al-
lowed the study to conclude that “fathers who actively seek custody
obtain either primary or joint physical custody over 70% of the
time.”116 However, based on its own data and not ignoring potential
gender bias against fathers, the study could also have trumpeted any
of the following results, leading to far different conclusions:
· Mothers get primary residential custody 93.4% of the time in di-
vorces.117
· Fathers in divorce get primary residential custody only 2.5% of
the time.118
· Fathers in divorce get joint physical custody only 4% of the
time.119
· Fathers in divorce get primary or joint physical custody less
than 7% of the time.120
                                                                                                                   
bias against fathers who had to find and financially support another woman in their home
before being awarded custody.
114. By contrast, it did not miss an opportunity to explore out-of-court gender biases
that affected women in court, such as lack of employment opportunities. See id. at 784-85.
115. See id. at 747. The Commission dismissed the fact that “mothers more frequently
get primary physical custody of children following divorce” as not reflecting bias, but due to
“agreement of the parties and the fact that, in most families, mothers have been the pri-
mary caretakers of children.” Id. at 747-48. This conclusion is in stark contrast to the tre-
mendous increase in fathers’ rights groups over the last decade. See Sally Kalson, Dad’s in
Charge, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 16, 1998, at A1. If fathers were agreeing to mothers ob-
taining custody, then why would fathers form these groups to fight gender bias against fa-
thers, and to seek change in the family court system?
116. MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 106, at 825.
117. The study reported that the survey of family law attorneys showed 12,000 di-
vorces involving dependent children in two years, and 2100 cases in five years in which fa-
thers sought custody. See id. at 831 n.54. It concluded, without elucidation or citation to
authority, that the percentage of fathers seeking custody “increased recently” and that
half, instead of two-fifths, of the cases in which fathers sought custody occurred in the
most recent two years. See id. Accordingly, even accepting these unsupported assumptions,
the total number of divorces in the five-year period studied would be 24,000, meaning fa-
thers sought custody in 8.75% (2100) of them. See id. Of these 2100 cases, the study re-
ported that fathers received primary custody in 29% (609) of the cases and joint physical
custody in “an additional 65%” (969). Id. at 831. Thus, of 24,000 divorces in a five-year pe-
riod involving dependent children, mothers received custody in 93.4% (22,422) of the cases,
fathers received primary custody in 2.5% (609), and joint physical residency was awarded
in 4% (969) of the cases.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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· Where fathers actively seek custody, they receive primary resi-
dency in less than one out of three cases (29%),121 and joint
physical residency in less than half (46%).122
Unfortunately, the preceding five conclusions did not seem to fit
with the pre-conceived effort to “isolate patterns of behavior that dis-
advantage women and to examine the results of this behavior on the
economic status of women.”123
Finally, the foundation for the “70% solution” theory advanced by
the study is hopelessly weak. The number implies that if a father
wants custody, 70% of the time he will get either primary or joint
physical residency. The number does not explain, for example, in how
many of those cases mothers actually agreed that primary or joint
physical residency was best for their children. It does not explain
how many of those cases were contested cases where the judiciary
determined custody after a hearing on the merits. Nor does it explain
in how many of those cases the mother actively rejected custody or
was unavailable to care for the children. In short, problems in the
methodology underlying the 70% figure and basic failures to explore
other possible explanations, render the figure utterly useless in con-
cluding a lack of gender bias against fathers.124 Indeed, analyzed
                                                                                                                   
121. Although not providing any cross-referencing of cases, the study noted that this
same number (29%) of fathers seeking custody were also fathers who were primary care-
takers. Perhaps the study could have also trumpeted a more obvious fact: Judges tend to
side with pre-divorce primary caretakers in divorce-related child custody decisions. Then
the study could have explored the gender-based myths behind the primary caretaker stan-
dard, and perhaps advanced, rather than set back, the cause of gender equality and neu-
trality in determining children’s futures. See, e.g. WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 166.
122. See MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 106, at 825.
123. Id. at 763.
124. See Cathy Young, Do Fathers Have the Edge in Divorce?, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 10,
1996, at A11:
[T]he high success rate of men in custody battles is yet another contender for
the Phony Statistics Hall of Fame. The figures do not refer to contested cases. .
. . The work from which the Gender Bias Study gathered its numbers did not
separate contested and uncontested custody bids, but showed that mothers fil-
ing for sole custody received it 75 percent of the time . . . .
A Stanford study of more than 1,000 California couples divorced in the 1980s
suggests conventional wisdom is right. If both parents requested sole custody
when filing for divorce, it was awarded to mom in 45 percent and to dad in 11
percent of the cases, with joint physical custody for the rest. (When she asked
for sole custody and he for joint custody, the odds were 2-1 in her favor.)
The Massachusetts Study also attempted to prop up its 70% figure with two other studies
that purported to show “paternal success” in child custody matters. See Massachusetts
Study, supra note 106, at 831-32. In reality, the studies confirmed both the flawed method-
ology and failure to examine potential gender bias that forced fathers not to seek custody.
One study of 700 cases in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, between 1978 and 1984 “con-
firmed” that fathers received primary physical custody in two-thirds of the cases in which
they sought it. See id. Put another way, the Middlesex study cited by the Massachusetts
Study showed that mothers received primary residency 94.3% of the time; fathers received
primary residency 5.4% of the time; and joint physical residency was awarded 0.3% of the
time.
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fairly, the data underlying the figure strongly suggest social and cul-
tural forces at play beyond a holistic analysis of children s best inter-
ests. It cannot be fairly concluded through the analysis of these data
that those forces are based on gender bias against fathers, but it can
be fairly concluded that the study does not refute such gender bias.
C.   Discriminating Against Fathers as Men
Much has been written about and many studies conducted re-
garding gender stereotypes and sex-based discrimination against
women. Comparatively, little attention has been focused on gender
stereotypes and sex-based discrimination against men.125 Yet, as Pro-
fessor Leo Kanowitz wrote nearly twenty years ago:
Centuries of sex-role allocation, based on “habit, rather than
analysis,” simply disabled Americans of either sex from restruc-
turing the duties of military service, family support, and protec-
tions in the work place so as to permit men and women to share
the burdens and benefits of social existence more equitably.
Viewed in this light, the apparent power of men to change their
sex-based roles in the past can be seen as being more theoretical
than real. In this respect, men were as powerless as any other dis-
crete, insular minority; past discrimination against them was in-
vidious in every sense of the word.126
One expert noted that “[i]n sum, over the past two hundred years,
fatherhood has lost, in full or in part, each of its four traditional
roles: irreplaceable caregiver, moral educator, head of family, and
family breadwinner.”127 Thus, particularly since the inception of the
Industrial Revolution, the role of the father in the father-child dy-
namic has become unclear and undefined. Yet, compared to mothers,
little focus has been placed on understanding the role of fathers and
diminishing discrimination against them. Instead, more effort has
seemingly been placed in disseminating anti-father propaganda that
                                                                                                                   
A third study cited by the Massachusetts Study involved 500 cases from Middlesex
County from 1978 to 1981. See id. at 832. The study was referred to as concluding that
when fathers sought sole custody they received it 41% of the time and joint custody (no
definition of legal or physical custody was offered) in 38% of the cases. See id. Given that
fathers in that study sought sole custody only 8% of the time--compared to 8.14% in the
other Middlesex County study and an estimated 8.75% in the Massachusetts Study--
another interpretation of the same data is that mothers received sole or primary custody in
93.8% of the cases, compared to fathers receiving sole custody in 3.2% or joint custody in
3%.
125. For example, a cursory search of the Florida State University’s computerized li-
brary index lists 2182 publications on feminism and 236 on motherhood, compared to 19 on
fathers’ rights and 50 on fatherhood.
126. Leo Kanowitz, “Benign” Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 1379, 1402 (1980).
127. BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 16.
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devalues fathers. For example, Joan Zorza, an author who writes
about domestic violence, noted in a recent article that:
[a]fter separation, fathers tend to fade from their children’s lives,
even when they have joint custody and are strongly encouraged to
stay involved. Not only do separated fathers have less physical
contact with their children, but also they become less altruistic
over time, less likely to pay child support, and further likely to dis-
engage from their children.128
Even though this article purportedly focused on domestic violence
among mothers and fathers, Zorza transcended the original premise
to make broad comments about the inferiority of fathers in general,
“whether or not abusive.”129 Although numerous studies show that fa-
thers with joint custody are much more likely to pay child support,130
Zorza stated that “[j]oint legal custody does not increase the father’s
compliance with child support orders, does not result in his assuming
greater child-rearing responsibilities, and does not increase the
amount of time he spends visiting with his children.”131 Many experts
disagree with these conclusions.132 Clearly, Zorza uses domestic vio-
lence as a springboard from which to attack fathers in general, a
practice she implements in other articles as well.133
                                                                                                                   
128. Zorza, supra note 110, at 1123 (citing as an example David Scheff, If It’s Tuesday,
It Must Be Dad’s House, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 26, 1995, at 64-65).
129. Id. at 1120.
130. See, e.g., Bahr et al., supra note 108, at 258 (noting that a recent Census Bureau
study found that 90% of fathers with joint legal custody paid child support, compared to
79% of fathers with visitation privileges and 45% of fathers who had neither joint custody
nor visitation privileges); JUDITH A. SELTZER, FATHER BY LAW: EFFECTS OF JOINT LEGAL
CUSTODY ON NONRESIDENT FATHERS’ INVOLVEMENT WITH CHILDREN 17 (Center for Demog-
raphy and Ecology NSFH Working Paper No. 75, 1997) (finding that joint legal custody in-
creased adherence to child support payments and contact with children, and concluding
that “[a]t least on the dimension of increased contact between nonresident fathers and
children, joint legal custody may, as advocates claim, make the lives of children after di-
vorce more similar to their lives before divorce or to the lives of their peers in two-parent
households”).
131. Zorza, supra note 110, at 1124.
132. See, e.g., Bahr et al., supra note 108; SELTZER, supra note 130, at 17; Mitchell Tes-
timony, supra note 14 (noting that divorced fathers who are allowed to remain significantly
involved with their children are more likely to pay child support); Madonna E. Bowman &
Constance R. Ahrons, Impact of Legal Custody Status on Fathers’ Parenting Postdivorce, 47
J. MARRIAGE AND FAM. 481, 481-88 (1985) (reporting that joint legal custody increased the
amount of time fathers spent with children).
133. See, e.g., Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality
Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273 (1995). Again, while purporting to address bat-
tered women, Zorza assailed fathers at large:
Joint custody awards do not improve the lot of the children. In fact, most chil-
dren in court-imposed joint custody (not just those with abusive fathers) do
poorly and are more depressed and disturbed than children in sole custody,
even when the parents genuinely choose joint custody. Furthermore, joint cus-
tody results in lower child support awards, which fathers are no more likely to
pay than awards made when the mother has sole custody. Joint custody does
not even result in the father spending any more time with his children.
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These generalized distortions encourage the anti-father attack
and promote the limitation of the father’s role to financial provider
and insignificant caretaker. Viewed from the opposite end of the
twentieth century, the continuous refrain throughout the last one
hundred years has been that when it comes to childrearing, fathers
are not that important.134 Consequently, “In most parts of the coun-
try, only if the mother is grossly negligent or abusive does the father
have a chance of keeping custody. Even then, the cards of the family
court system are stacked against him.”135
Conversely, since the 1960s, society has made a significant effort
to assist women with throwing off the shackles of societally imposed
gender stereotypes, most notably by passing much-needed laws to
protect women seeking economic self-sufficiency.136 However, because
of persistent stereotypical beliefs that women are not as efficient as
                                                                                                                   
Id. at 279 (citations omitted). In addition to Zorza, other legal scholars have negatively
generalized the role of fathers. For example, a University of Florida College of Law Profes-
sor began her article with the following language:
Fathers parent less than mothers. Both within and outside of marriage, they
nurture their children (and step-children, and children in general) far less than
mothers (and other women) do. Not only do fathers parent less, they abandon
their children to a remarkable extent, again far exceeding such conduct by
women.
Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REV. 523, 523 (1996) (citing NANCY E.
DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES (1997)). Imagine an article stating, for ex-
ample, that “mothers are far less qualified to work in professional positions than fathers.
They take off more time to have and care for children, and suffer from a lack of business
acumen due to the fact that they are more emotional and prone to hysteria.” Such writing
would rightfully be labeled as inflammatory, stereotypical, gender-based discrimination.
Why should Dowd’s article be seen as anything less? Undoubtedly, our culture currently
condones a double standard when it comes to evaluating female/male attributes: it is ac-
ceptable to communicate generalized, discriminatory comments about men, but in turn it is
unacceptable—and in some cases, downright illegal—to communicate discriminatory com-
ments toward women. Others have noted the trend toward disparaging men. See, e.g.,
Warren Farrell, Men as Success Objects, UTNE READER, May-June 1991, at 81-82 (“A visit
to the bookstore turns up titles like No Good Men. Imagine No Good Women or No Good
Jews.”).
The first Zorza article cited in the above text was distributed to students participating in
a Florida State University College of Law program that trains students to work with alleg-
edly battered women. Many of these students will eventually practice in the area of family
law. Such anti-father rhetoric will likely influence their perceptions of fathers, and thus
the manner in which they respond to the role of the father in their future practices.
134. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 70-83.
135. WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 32.
136. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”). Title VII includes
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1994) (“The terms ‘because of
sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability
to work . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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men in traditional male-dominated jobs, or that women are not the
primary familial breadwinners,137 women still earn only 71.5% of
every dollar a man earns for the same job.138 Moreover, while white
men are a minority in the total work force (47%) and in the number
of those with college degrees (48%), they hold the top jobs in nearly
every field.139
For the most part, however, our culture and laws have, within the
last twenty-five years, encouraged women to enter into traditional
male territories such as the workplace.140 At the same time, though,
our culture has continued to assure women that they will be recog-
nized and protected as the primary caregivers of children, even when
women trade their traditional roles as home-dwelling caretakers for
workplace laborers.141 By contrast, our culture and our laws have not
uniformly promoted father involvement in the home and with chil-
dren. Accordingly, most men have not been permitted by society to
likewise alter their roles to fully participate in childrearing.142
D.   Protecting the “Weaker Sex”: The State as Mr. Right
Society views women as weaker than men and in need of protec-
tion, whether by a man or by society when no man is available.143
Traditionally, this protection was provided by a woman’s connection
to a man through the marriage contract.144 However, with the in-
crease in divorce, the state has taken it upon itself to act as the
guardian of women.
This movement toward protection of women is a reaction to the
success of the notion that women, as individuals, could be freed
from dependence on men . . . . At a more general level, the women’s
movement is clamoring to build some sort of safety net or shield for
women. The movement wants to return women to a position where
their biological differences are taken into account. But rather than
do this through the informal structures that traditionally per-
formed this role, rather than allow men and women to form con-
                                                                                                                   
137. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 7, at 388-93 (discussing Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)). In Johnson, Diane Joyce, a widowed mother of four, was
harassed by male co-workers, who claimed she was “taking a man’s job away” because she
was the first woman to seek and receive a road dispatcher position. See id. at 390.
138. See Affirmative Action for the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 1085, The
Equal Opportunity Act, Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104 Cong.
Rec. 63 (1996) (testimony of Marcia D. Greenberger, Co-President, National Women’s Law
Center), available in 1996 WL 10162842.
139. See id.
140. See Chavez, supra note 8, at 740.
141. Others might note that women are not necessarily “recognized and protected” as
primary caregivers as much as they are forced into the role through culturally and state-
instituted measures that assure women assume this position. See supra Part II.
142. See, e.g., supra note 108 and accompanying text.
143. See Chavez, supra note 8, at 741.
144. See id.
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tracts in marriage and work out an arrangement that provides
some security and protection for women, the movement asks the
state to take on the role of protector.
This approach has placed Uncle Sam in Mr. Right’s shoes. The
state places formal rules, laws, and regulations where informal
systems of social control formerly existed. Laws insist that women
be provided for through equal pay where social structures used to
provide the means of survival. Laws command men to behave in a
certain way with respect to women, because the informal controls
that used to define the boundaries of behavior have been de-
stroyed.145
In some cases this protection is appropriate, such as when legal pro-
tection is provided to battered women and women sexually harassed
in the workplace. Yet, in custody determinations, women receive a
clear and unequivocal advantage over men when they receive pri-
mary residential custody of children approximately 90% of the
time.146 This result assures mothers great power over fathers largely
due to stereotypical beliefs that mothers must be primary caretak-
ers—a belief promoted and protected by the courts who award moth-
ers custody in overwhelming numbers.147 Mothers are further advan-
                                                                                                                   
145. Id. This governmental oversight, which strictly regulates the role of non-custodial
parents in the post-divorce state, contrasts quite significantly with government’s oversight
of intact families. Cynthia L. Ewing, Senior Policy Analyst with the Children’s Rights
Council, vividly describes what can happen when parents divorce and the state steps in to
enforce prescribed parental responsibilities:
I have a husband and children and our family is intact. My husband becomes
involuntarily unemployed and may go many, many months without a job. He is
not able to support our children and may not be able to for a long time. How
would each of you characterize this situation? Unfortunate or sad? What will
you call my husband? A dead-beat? How is my government going to interfere in
our family relationships? Will my government interfere with his ability to find
a new job by revoking his driver’s license or trade license? Will he be thrown in
jail for not supporting our kids? Of course not! But, if my husband and I legally
separate or divorce, everything is different. If he loses his job and cannot sup-
port our children, the government intrudes into our lives in a major way. I will
likely be awarded custody of our children, he will be allowed to “visit” them per
a schedule and he will be ordered to provide financial support. If he does not
support our children, regardless of the fact that he has lost his job, he will be
labeled a “deadbeat,” have his trade license and driver’s license revoked, and he
may even be thrown in jail.
Ewing Testimony, supra note 19.
146. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Kanowitz, supra note 126, at 1394. Professor Leo Kanowitz notes ways in
which protections for women have caused discrimination against men:
[A] casual glance at the treatment males have received at the hands of the law solely
because they are males suggests that they have paid an awesome price for other ad-
vantages they have presumably enjoyed over females in our society. Whether one
talks of the male’s unique obligation of compulsory military service, his primary duty
for spousal and child support, his lack of the same kinds of protective labor legislation
that have traditionally been enjoyed by women, or the statutory or judicial preference
in child custody disputes that has long been accorded to mothers vis-a-vis fathers of
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taged because custody commonly is accompanied by a child support
order (which does not have to be accounted for to fathers),148 the fa-
milial residence, and the primary decisionmaking power regarding
the children. As primary custodians, mothers are also awarded the
opportunity to spend significantly more time with the children,
thereby having a greater influence on their children’s growth and de-
velopment.
Some have begun to recognize that when society protects women,
that is, when it places women upon “pedestals” and awards them a
custody advantage, it is confining women within an overly sentimen-
talized “cage.”149 By requiring mothers to be the primary caregivers of
children, whether or not they desire to be, society continues to com-
municate to mothers that they must choose their children over all
else or risk being labeled a failure as a mother, and as a woman.150
Thus, women who voluntarily relinquish primary custody are fre-
quently seen by society as “misguided, selfish, unnatural.”151 This re-
frain continues, despite the fact that numerous opportunities, nota-
                                                                                                                   
minor children, sex discrimination against males in statutes and judicial decisions
has been widespread and severe.
Moreover . . . it is clear that males have been subjected to massive social and eco-
nomic discrimination. The general social expectation that men will perform the
breadwinner’s role, the equanimity with which men’s exclusive liability for military
service is regarded by the general population, even during times of violent combat, the
philosophy that a man’s life is less precious than that of a woman, as expressed in the
tradition of “women and children first” when ships are about to go beneath the sea,
and the raised eyebrows at the prospect of a male who, breaking the shackles of his
traditional sex role, determines to expend most of his daily energies in caring for his
children and doing what have traditionally been regarded as wifely chores within the
home, all suggest that men at all ages have been victims of virulent sex discrimina-
tion comparable to the kinds of discrimination that women as a group have suffered.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
148. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.30 (1997) (failing to provide any requirement that child
support recipients account for how the support is spent); Ewing Testimony, supra note 19:
[T]here is the issue of accountability for child support. The simple fact that fi-
nancial resources are being transferred from one parent to the other without
any accounting of how this money is being spent is a disincentive [to paying
child support]. In many cases, it is blatantly obvious that so-called child sup-
port money is not being used for the benefit of the child. Just as there is a basic
accountability requirement for anyone acting in a fiduciary capacity, there
should be an accountability requirement placed on custodial parents for the use
of the financial resources that are provided for the benefit of the child.
149. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (“There can be no doubt that our
Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical
effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”) (citation omitted).
150. See GEOFFREY L. GREIF & MARY S. PABST, MOTHERS WITHOUT CUSTODY 147-49
(1988).
151. Sanger, supra note 32, at 377 (“Separating from one’s child—even temporarily,
even for sensible reasons—is now often viewed as the worst thing a mother can do. It is of-
ten taken as proof that she is not a good mother at all and should not be allowed to resume
the status she has abandoned.”).
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bly in education and employment, have opened up to women over the
last thirty years.152
Yet although opportunities for women have grown outside of the
home, the beliefs that people hold about how women should act in-
side the home have not necessarily kept pace. Many people believe
that it is good that women have more choices than before, so long
as the changes do not take away from their time with their chil-
dren. . . . The new opportunities they have achieved have not ex-
tended to permission to live away from their children. Thus, a di-
vorced mother is in a precarious position—encouraged to pursue
life outside the home but discouraged from doing so without her
children. Thus, women are penalized if they are mothers.153
This double-bind furthers the continued subjugation of women:
“tethering mothers to children by discouraging separations . . . also
serves less felicitous functions, such as keeping women out of the la-
bor force, securing their services for free at home, and sustaining a
comforting set of social relationships.”154 Although women may seek
to free themselves from the constraints of marriage and also perhaps
their role as the primary caretakers of children when they serve as
such, gender bias imbedded in the court system ensures that women
remain in this role even after divorce, whether or not they want to
continue in that role, and whether or not the imposition of that role
is truly in the best interests of the child. Despite the efforts of legis-
latures to extract this gender bias from the exercise of custody de-
terminations, courts have nonetheless clung to traditional percep-
tions of women as primary caretakers of children in need of state
protection.
E.   The Court and the Legislature: The Battle to Control Custody
Considerations
Adhering to the motherhood mystique, courts, many of which are
presided over by judges raised in traditional homes consisting of fa-
thers as breadwinners and mothers as caretakers,155 have resisted
letting go of the tender years doctrine and the all things being equal
doctrine, occasionally doing battle with legislatures over the child
                                                                                                                   
152. See Chavez, supra note 8, at 740.
153. GREIF & PABST, supra note 150, at 2-3.
154. Sanger, supra note 32, at 384-85 (noting that the act of separating from children
“threatens the welfare of those for whom the institution of motherhood provides an impor-
tant sense of identity (many mothers) and an important source of comfort (everyone else).”
155. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analy-
sis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 406-07, 433-37 (1996) (noting
that the judges in the empirical study that she conducted in New York were overwhelm-
ingly male and “sixtyish”); A. Yasmine Rassam, Note, “Mother,” “Parent,” and Bias, 69 IND.
L.J. 1165, 1170-73 (1994) (noting that “a judge's background can influence the decision-
making process”).
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custody issue. For example, in 1971 the Florida Legislature amended
Florida’s child custody law in an effort to repeal the tender years doc-
trine: “Upon considering all relevant factors, the father of the child
shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining
custody.”156 Nonetheless, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principles behind the tender years doctrine four years later in con-
cluding that the all things being equal doctrine was not changed by
the 1971 statute.157 In 1982, the Florida Legislature responded by
specifying that fathers and mothers were to be given equal consid-
eration despite the age of the child.158 Yet, some courts continued to
resist the change.159 In 1991, the Legislature responded again, saying
neither the age nor sex of the child made a difference as between fa-
thers and mothers in custody considerations.160
The message seemed to finally reach judges who wanted to apply
either of the two outdated doctrines, when, in 1995, a Florida appel-
late court stated that “[t]he tender years doctrine is not a relevant
fact, but an impermissible gender-based preference favoring the
mother as custodian of a young child.”161 Nonetheless, some judicial
circuits in Florida established “visitation guidelines” that reincorpo-
                                                                                                                   
156. Act effective July 1, 1971, ch. 71-241, § 15, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319, 1325 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1997)).
157. See Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1975) (“The district court appar-
ently considered the general rule, still viable despite the ‘equal consideration’ set forth in
F.S.A. s 61.13(2), that, other essential factors being equal, the mother of infants of tender
years should receive prime consideration for custody. ‘Equal consideration’ to a father re-
sulting in a finding of ‘other factors being equal’ still invokes the traditional rule for prime
consideration being given the mother for custody of infants of tender years.”).
158. See Act effective July 1, 1982, ch. 82-96, §§ 1, 4, 1982 Fla. Laws 233, 233 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1997)).
159. See, e.g., DeCamp v. Hein, 541 So. 2d 708, 709-10 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989):
[W]e note the provision in section 61.13(2)(b)(1) that “the father of the child
shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the pri-
mary residence of the child irrespective of the age of the child.” . . . This statu-
tory language at first blush appears to abolish the tender years doctrine, as in-
deed the Fifth District believes it has. Yet, this very same section also provides
that the equal rights provision only applies “after considering all relevant
facts.” . . . Relevant facts should obviously include, at least in part, some con-
sideration of the tender years doctrine. It is true that the doctrine can no longer
be dispositive because the 1983 amendment to the statute added the “irrespec-
tive of age” language; however, we do not believe the doctrine has been totally
abolished. For example, a six-month-old baby being nursed by her mother
should obviously be in her mother’s custody, unless the judge found her unfit.
In the case at bar, there is no mention of whether the one-year-old was being
nursed by the mother. Nonetheless, our version of common sense suggests that,
under the facts of this particular case, the one-year-old female infant and her
three-year-old sister preferably should reside with the mother.
Id. (citing, but refusing to follow, Kerr v. Kerr, 486 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), which
found that section 61.13(2)(b)(1) unequivocally abolished the tender years doctrine).
160. See Act effective July 1, 1991, ch. 91-246, § 4, Fla. Laws 2408, 2411 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1997)).
161. Cherradi v. Lavoie, 662 So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
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rated the tender years doctrine. For example, as late as 1996, the
guidelines in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit provided that a noncusto-
dial parent—almost always the father—could not have overnight
visitation with a child until the child turned two years old.162 Despite
clear evidence about the importance of father involvement in early
childhood development,163 the guidelines provided noncustodial par-
ents actual physical access to their child for less than 5% of their
child’s first twenty-four months of life. In 1996, the Florida Legisla-
ture responded once again, overturning the guidelines by amending
the law to read: “If the court orders that parental responsibility, in-
cluding visitation, be shared by both parents, the court may not deny
the noncustodial parent overnight contact and access or visitation
with the child solely because of the age or sex of the child.”164
Nonetheless, the presumption in favor of mother-custody contin-
ues to prevail inside and outside of Florida:
In the past two decades, most states have abandoned as unconsti-
tutional the formal presumption in favor of mothers being awarded
custody, and a number of states use language encouraging shared
parenting in their custody statutes. However, gender is still a
statutory consideration in several jurisdictions.
The child’s best interests standard ostensibly considers more di-
rect criteria of parenting capacity and patterns. Nevertheless, de-
cisions favor mothers in a number of ways. Joint custody laws still
prefer mothers as physical custodians. The primary caretaker
standard, adopted explicitly in West Virginia and Minnesota, and
implicitly in a number of other jurisdictions, may be a thinly veiled
return to the maternal preference standard. Even in states in
which the formal maternal presumption is absent, judges may
make decisions as though such a presumption still exists, or may
exhibit strong biases against awarding custody to fathers. Moreo-
ver, as an empirical matter, mothers obtain sole custody in an
overwhelming proportion of cases.165
                                                                                                                   
162. See FLORIDA S. JUDICIARY STAFF, A REPORT ON CIRCUIT COURT STANDARD
VISITATION SCHEDULES 7 (1996).
163. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 35-50; infra Part III.F.
164. Act effective July 1, 1996, ch. 96-183, § 5, 1996 Fla. Laws 454, 457 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(8) (1997)). In 1997, the Florida Legislature amended chapter 61 to state
that “[t]he court may order rotating custody if the court finds that rotating custody will be
in the best interest of the child.” Act effective July 1, 1997, ch. 97-242, § 2, 1997 Fla. Laws
4436, 4437 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.121 (1997) (emphasis added)). It is too early to tell
whether this permissive amendment will have much effect on custody considerations.
However, it is noteworthy that the Florida Legislature is actively moving in the direction
of recognizing and promoting the role of both parents in raising their children through mu-
tually significant and substantial involvement.
165. Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1075-78 (1996) (footnotes omitted); see also WARSHAK, supra note
6, at 234. Regarding the primary caretaker standard, Warshak states:
I do not believe it makes any sense to equate the amount of time a person
spends with a child with that person’s importance in the child’s life. Research
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F.   When Fathers Are Marginalized
Sociologists, psychologists, criminal justice experts, and others
have begun to closely examine the issue of fatherhood in our Ameri-
can culture and how and why fathers came to be ousted from a sig-
nificant role in childrearing. Statistics clearly show that children
without fathers are more likely to suffer increased psychological,
educational, behavioral, and health disorders, and our society is more
likely to suffer increased crime and violence. For example, a 1988
United States Department of Health and Human Services study
found that at every income level except the very highest (over
$50,000 a year), children living with never-married mothers were
more likely than their counterparts in two-parent families to have
been expelled or suspended from school, to display emotional prob-
lems, and to engage in antisocial behavior.166 Children in single-
parent families are two to three times as likely as children in two-
parent families to have emotional and behavioral problems.167 They
are also more likely to drop out of high school, to get pregnant as
                                                                                                                   
indicates that we cannot even assume that, the more time a parent interacts
with a child, the better their relationship will be. In fact, we all know of parents
who are too involved with their children, so-called smothering parents, who
squelch any signs of their child’s independence. . . . Is the primary caretaker
the parent who does the most to foster the child’s sense of security, the person
to whom the child turns in time of stress—the role most often associated with
mothers? Or is it the parent who does the most to promote the child’s ability to
meet the demands of the world outside the family and to make independent
judgments—the role most often associated with fathers? We really have no ba-
sis for preferring one contribution over the other. Both are necessary for
healthy psychological functioning.
Id. Indeed, if many fathers are behaving according to their societally prescribed roles as
primary familial breadwinners, then it is patently unfair to deprive them of a meaningful
relationship with their children simply because they spend their day in the workplace to
provide for their children, rather than in the home caring for their children in person. Both
forms of caretaking are essential to raising children, and one should not be perceived as
more worthy than the other. Moreover, it is important to note that in this age, frequently
both parents work. See Kathleen A. DeLaney, Note, A Response to “Nannygate”: Untan-
gling U.S. Immigration Law to Enable American Parents to Hire Foreign Child Care Pro-
viders, 70 IND. L.J. 305, 327 (1993) (citing WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
EMPLOYERS AND CHILD CARE: BENEFITING WORK AND FAMILY 1 (1989) (“The typical family
during the first half of the twentieth century included a father who was breadwinner and a
mother who stayed home to care for the children and do the housework. Today both par-
ents usually work outside the home.”)). By necessity, when both parents work, both par-
ents usually share “child care and household responsibilities.” Phyllis T. Bookspan, A Deli-
cate Imbalance—Family and Work, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 37, 77 (1995). Thus, the deter-
mination of exactly who is the “primary caretaker” is even more difficult. Furthermore,
when parents divorce, frequently the number of mothers who work increases. See Nancy E.
Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 444 (1990)
(noting that the percentage of divorced mothers in the workplace ranges from 69% to 83%
depending upon the ages of their children). Therefore, when both parents work, the pre-
sumption that the mother is nearly always the primary caretaker is further weakened.
166. See FATHER FACTS, supra note 16, at 30 (citation omitted) (compiling statistics
from a variety of governmental and private sources).
167. See id.
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teenagers, to abuse drugs, and to be in trouble with the law.168 Eighty
percent of adolescents in psychiatric hospitals come from broken
homes.169 Three out of four teenage suicides occur in households
where a parent has been absent.170 Compared to children living with
both biological parents, children living apart from their biological fa-
thers experience more accidental injury, asthma, frequent head-
aches, and speech defects.171 Children who live apart from their fa-
thers are more than four times more likely to smoke cigarettes as
teenagers than children growing up with a father in the home.172
Seventy-two percent of adolescent murderers grew up without fa-
thers.173 Sixty percent of America’s rapists grew up in homes without
fathers.174
The one factor that most closely correlates with crime is the ab-
sence of the father in the family.175 This relationship is so closely re-
lated that controlling for family configuration erases the relationship
between race and crime and between low income and crime.176
In response to these and other significant findings, groups pro-
moting the recognition of the father’s role in childrearing have met,
brainstormed, and implemented programs intended to encourage and
                                                                                                                   
168. See id. at 31.
169. See id. at 32.
170. See id. at 33.
171. See id. at 36.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 24. Notably, Mitchell Johnson, the 13-year-old who allegedly partici-
pated in the March 1998 murders of four children and one adult in Jonesboro, Arkansas,
had remarked in recent weeks that he had been missing his father, who remained in Min-
nesota after the boy and his mother moved to Arkansas one year earlier following his par-
ents’ divorce. See Ellen O’Brien, “A Sense of Innocence Was Lost,” Jonesboro Buries Shoot-
ing Victims and Tries to Heal, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 1998, at A1.
174. See FATHER FACTS, supra note 16, at 24.
175. See id. at 23.
176. See id. On the other hand, some feminist writers have claimed that the alleged
correlation between fatherlessness and issues such as crime, violence, and teenage preg-
nancies are simply an attempt to degrade single mothers. For example:
We speak of the “broken” family, the “disintegration” of the family, the “cri-
sis” in the family, the “unstable” family, the “decline” of the family, and, per-
haps inevitably from some perspectives, the “death” of the family. Underlying
such labels is the specter of single motherhood—statistically on the upswing—
pathological and disease-like, contaminating society, contributing to its destruc-
tion and degeneration.
Single motherhood has been designated as the source of other social phenom-
ena such as crime and poverty. Indeed, in the public’s mind, and despite over-
whelming evidence to the contrary, the face of poverty has increasingly become
that of a single mother . . . .
Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, in POVERTY LAW: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 351, 355 (Julie A. Nice & Louise G. Trubek eds., 1994) (citations omitted).
While some may indeed blame single mothers for the wealth of social ills that plague our
society, the focus should instead be on what is in the best interests of children. Children
need, want, and are entitled to all of the love and support that they can get, and fathers
should be encouraged to fully participate and care for their children, whom they have an
equal right to parent. See infra Part IV.
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promote fathers’ involvement in their children’s lives.177 Nonetheless,
despite plenty of evidence that children need integral and consistent
love and support from their fathers as well as mothers, many family
courts fail to ensure that fathers play a meaningful role by awarding
the children significant time with both parents in addition to joint le-
gal responsibility for the children. At times, however, a ray of en-
lightenment does appear. In 1996, a Florida court stated:
With the focus of so much recent statewide and national attention
on the absentee parent and the deadbeat dad, we should do every-
thing within our power to encourage responsible parenthood,
which consists not only of the legal obligation of financial support
but also the maintenance of a meaningful relationship with the
child. We should encourage the noncustodial parent, who is often
the father, to view the relationship with his child not as an obliga-
tion which he fights every inch of the way, but as a responsibility
he rushes to embrace. The ability of the noncustodial parent to de-
velop and maintain a meaningful relationship with the child in-
ures to the benefit of not only the parent, but also the child.178
While some courts are moving toward recognizing the importance
of encouraging divorcing fathers to remain integrally involved in the
lives of their children, awarding them primary residential custody, or
even rotating custody, is another issue. Overwhelmingly awarding
mothers sole or primary residential custody of children may not only
be grossly unfair to fathers and children, but the practice may violate
fathers’ constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws, and
their fundamental right to parent their children.
IV.   THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A.   The Equal Protection Clau se and Gender Discrimination
The Fourteenth Amendment, enacted by Congress in 1868, states
that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”179
Congress intended to ensure that racial minorities received the same
degree of personal and property rights as enjoyed by white persons
                                                                                                                   
177. For example, in 1996, the Florida Legislature created the 25-member Commission
on Responsible Fatherhood, the first legislatively created commission on fatherhood issues
in the nation. The Commission’s purpose is:
to raise awareness of the problems created when a child grows up without the
presence of a responsible father, to identify obstacles that impede or prevent
the involvement of responsible fathers in the lives of their children, and to
identify strategies that are successful in encouraging responsible fatherhood.
Act effective July 1, 1996, ch. 96-175, § 67, 1996 Fla. Laws 320, 398 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 383.0112 (1997)).
178. Willey v. Willey, 683 So. 2d 647, 651 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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(usually men).180 At first, the Supreme Court interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause to apply only to racial equality and no other classi-
fication.181 Thus, in a case decided the day after the Slaughter-House
Cases,182 the Court denied a woman’s request for a license to practice
law.183 The Court later upheld a statute that prohibited women from
working in factories for more than ten hours per day.184 In subse-
quent direct challenges on equal protection grounds, the Court like-
wise upheld statutes denying women equal protection of the law.185
By 1971, however, the Court recognized that statutes designed
primarily to restrict women to stereotypical roles should be subject to
                                                                                                                   
180. See HERMINE HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 150-51 (1977). The Civil Rights Act had been passed to empower the Thir-
teenth Amendment to address post-Civil War Black Codes, which were enacted by many
southern states to forbid African Americans from such activities as appearing in public,
owning property, or testifying in court against a white man. See STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 482 (1991).
181. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (stating that the
Court doubted “very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimina-
tion against the Negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision”); STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 676-77.
182. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
183. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873). While Justice Bradley
suggested in his dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases that a non-black class might be cov-
ered under the Equal Protection Clause, he made it clear in Bradwell that this possibility
did not include women:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of
the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in
the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly be-
longs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say
identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family in-
stitution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independ-
ent career from that of her husband. . . .
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any of the du-
ties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but these
are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount destiny and mission of
women are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the
law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general
constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.
Id. at 141-42; see also STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 676-77.
184. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (stating that the “inherent differ-
ence between the two sexes” justified restricting a woman’s right to contract). But see
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that the statute prohibiting bakers,
mostly men, from working more than 60 hours per week was forbidden by the liberty of
contract implicit in the due process clause); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 677.
185. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding a Michigan stat-
ute that required a woman bartender to be the wife or daughter of the male owner); Hoyt
v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961) (refusing to strike down a jury selection system that ex-
cluded women who did not proactively indicate a desire to serve). In Hoyt, Justice Harlan
wrote that a “woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. We cannot say
that it is constitutionally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general wel-
fare, to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless
she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own special responsibili-
ties.” Id. at 62.
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stricter review.186 The Court struck down a statute that preferred
male estate administrators over female administrators as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.187 The Court stated that it was ap-
plying the rational relation test,188 but because it rejected the state’s
administrative reason for the discrimination, the court actually ap-
plied a heightened level of scrutiny. In Frontiero v. Richardson ,189 the
Court explicitly stated that gender-based classifications are inher-
ently suspect and should be subject to strict scrutiny.190 However, in
the next gender-based challenge reviewed by the Court,191 it re-
                                                                                                                   
186. The Court uses three standards of review. First, strict scrutiny is applied to any
statute based on a suspect classification or fundamental right. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[C]ourts must subject [all legal restrictions that curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group] to the most rigid scrutiny.”) Government must show
a necessary and compelling reason for burdening a specific race, national origin, or alien-
age. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 24 (1972).
Second, intermediate scrutiny is applied to any statute based on the quasi-suspect
classes of gender. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (“A classification ‘must be rea-
sonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike.’” (citation omitted)). The Court uses this level of review for
invidious (intentionally harmful) or benign (intending to help women or redress past dis-
crimination against them) discrimination. See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 679-82,
713-18. Government must show a substantially related interest to an important govern-
mental objective. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Third, the rational relation test is applied to any statute not based on a suspect or quasi-
suspect class; the government action must bear a rational relationship to an acceptable
goal sought by the government. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (3rd
ed. 1986). The statute will be upheld as long as it bears a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental objective, which is almost always the case. See id. Prior to 1971, the
Supreme Court reviewed gender classifications using the rational relation test. See HERMA
HILL KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 26-27 (2d ed. 1981). In 1971, the Court began to use
a heightened level of scrutiny when reviewing gender-based statutes. See id.; Reed, 404
U.S. at 75.
187. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
188. See id. at 74.
189. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
190. See id. at 682 (stating that classifications based on sex are “inherently suspect
and must therefore be subject to strict judicial scrutiny”). Notably, Justice Brennan wrote:
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic deter-
mined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon
the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate “the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility.” And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect
statutes as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized
suspect criteria, is that sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability
to perform or contribute to society.
Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
191. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (reviewing an Oklahoma statute that for-
bade the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 while females over 18 could pur-
chase the beer).
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treated to an intermediate level of scrutiny for reviewing gender-
based classifications.192
Intermediate scrutiny is also applied when the Court reviews
statutes or policies enacted to remedy past discrimination against
women.193 These remedial statutes or policies frequently result in
“benign discrimination” against men; that is, they were not enacted
with the express intent to discriminate against men but do so as a
byproduct of the government action.194 Nonetheless, if the statute or
policy is narrowly tailored to be substantially related to an important
government interest that is remedial in nature, it will likely be up-
held.195
1.   Intent to Discriminate Is Required
For a plaintiff to prevail in a claim that a government act violates
the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
government intended to discriminate.196 Intent can be proven by
                                                                                                                   
192. See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 680-82. Despite the heightened level of scru-
tiny, the Court has nonetheless continued to uphold some statutes that discriminate
against either gender. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S.
464, 475 (1981) (upholding a statute subjecting men but not women to statutory rape
charges when they engage in sex with a partner under the age of 18); Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding the male-only draft); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 510 (1975) (sustaining a federal statute that granted female navy members a longer
time period in which to achieve a mandatory promotion); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,
356 (1974) (upholding a Florida statute that provided a property tax exemption for widows
but not widowers); Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (upholding California’s ex-
clusion of pregnancy-related disabilities under the state’s disability insurance program).
Consequently, the Court has sent mixed messages as to exactly which level of scrutiny
would be used when reviewing equal protection challenges to laws. See STONE ET AL., supra
note 180, at 681-82.
193. See, e.g., Kahn, 416 U.S. at 354.
194. See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 713-18.
195. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (upholding a federal social secu-
rity scheme that provided better benefits to women than men as an appropriate remedial
statute designed to redress “‘society’s longstanding disparate treatment of women’” rather
than one intending to restrict women to stereotypical female roles, or intentionally dis-
criminatory toward men) (citation omitted). But see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (striking down a state university’s policy of precluding men from
its nursing school as unrelated to remedial goals). Notably, Justice O’Connor wrote that by
restricting men the University perpetuated a stereotype that only women should be
nurses. See id. at 736.
196. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 236 (1976) (holding that while a test given
to police officers may have had a discriminatory impact against African Americans, dis-
criminatory impact alone does not prove a discriminatory intent). The Court compared the
Equal Protection Clause to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and noted that a Title VII
plaintiff could prove an intent to discriminate by proving a disparate impact, from which
an intent to discriminate would be inferred. See id. at 238. Thus, a plaintiff can more easily
prove intent under Title VII than under the Equal Protection Clause. See id.; Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (“[I]n order for the Equal Protection Clause to be violated,
‘the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.’”) (citation omitted).
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showing that the law is facially discriminatory,197 that the law is ad-
ministered in a discriminatory manner,198 or that although the law is
facially neutral and appears to be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner, discrimination can be proven through an examination of the
legislative history or other evidence that clearly indicates a discrimi-
natory intent.199 Frequently, statistics are used to prove intent to dis-
criminate.200
                                                                                                                   
However, in Rogers, the Court noted that Washington and Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), “recognized that discriminatory
intent need not be proved by direct evidence. ‘Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it
is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.’” Rogers, 458 U.S. at 618
(quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 242). “Thus determining the existence of a discrimina-
tory purpose ‘demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available.’” Id. (quoting Arlington, 429 U.S. at 266). Note that these cases
involved race-based rather than gender-based challenges, to which strict scrutiny rather
than intermediate scrutiny is applied. See also Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (adding that the discrimination must be “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in
spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”). In Feeney the Court upheld a
state statute awarding a hiring preference to veterans, a group that consisted of 98% men.
See id. at 282.
197. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (striking down a state law prefer-
ring men over women as estate administrators).
198. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding that a facially
neutral San Francisco ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause where all members
of a class were denied permission to operate a business and almost all non-class members
were awarded a license). Since Feeney, however, proving discrimination through disparate
administration of a facially neutral law requires a nearly 100% impact against a suspect
class. Interview with Steve Gey, John W. & Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State
University College of Law, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Oct. 16, 1996). Consequently, impact alone
will not usually determine intent to discriminate. The Court will look for other evidence
that proves the intent to discriminate. See GERALD GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 365 (4th ed. 1986).
199. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 627-28 (holding that a facially neutral at-large county
election system violated the Equal Protection Clause because it had a discriminatory im-
pact on African American citizens and had been maintained by the Legislature for a dis-
criminatory purpose). In Rogers, the fact that no African American had ever been elected to
the Board did not prove discrimination by itself. See id. at 627. However, a review of racial
discrimination inherent in the local and state political process, as well as local elected offi-
cials’ discriminatory behavior, allowed the Court to infer an intent to discriminate through
maintenance of the election system. See id. It is important to note that besides race, this
case involved the right to vote, which is recognized as a fundamental right that must be
equitably distributed. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (stating that the
right to vote “is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. . . . [A]ny alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scruti-
nized”).
200. See GUNTHER, supra note 198, at 354; NOWAK ET AL., supra note 186, at 528-29
(noting that statistical evidence is especially influential when a plaintiff claims that ad-
ministrative officials are discriminating when engaging in an individual selection process).
Additionally, courts are less likely to defer to the subjective decisions of officials than to
legislative acts. See GUNTHER, supra note 198, at 529. When the selection process does not
require officials to exercise discretion, however, statistical data is frequently insufficient to
establish discrimination. See id.
928 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:891
B.   Substantive Due Process: Interference With Fundamental Rights
The Fourteenth Amendment contains the provision that “no state
shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”201 This clause
has been interpreted as limiting the substantive power of states to
regulate specific areas of individuals’ lives deemed to be protected by
a fundamental right.202 The Court first recognized a fundamental
right under the Equal Protection Clause in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 203
In Skinner, the Court struck down a state statute that allowed the
sterilization of certain criminals, thus interfering with what the
Court deemed to be the fundamental right to have children.204 Other
areas such as voting205 and interstate migration206 have been recog-
nized as fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. An unreasonable intrusion into these areas is deemed to inter-
fere with a person’s liberty.207
In a fundamental rights challenge, courts will first examine
whether the right at issue is fundamental or non-fundamental.208
Two classes of fundamental rights exist: those that are explicitly
guaranteed by the United States Constitution under the fundamen-
tal rights provision of the Equal Protection Clause,209 and those not
specifically constitutionally enumerated but recognized by the Court
as implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution under the Fourteenth
                                                                                                                   
201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
202. See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 815.
203. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
204. See id. at 536 (stating that “[t]his case touches a sensitive and important area of
human rights. Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the per-
petuation of a race—the right to have offspring”).
205. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (striking down a
poll tax because it interfered with the fundamental right to vote).
206. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (striking down as a violation of
the fundamental right to travel a state statute denying welfare benefits for one year to
people entering a new jurisdiction).
207. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The court held as follows:
[The liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. . . . [This] liberty may not be interfered with,
under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is
arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the compe-
tency of the State to effect.
Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
208. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
209. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (assuring the right to freedom of religion, speech,
the press, to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances).
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Amendment’s protection of fundamental rights.210 If the right is
deemed to be non-fundamental the courts will use the rational rela-
tion test to determine if states are pursuing a legitimate governmen-
tal objective; this analysis almost always leaves the government ac-
tion intact.211 If the right is deemed fundamental, however, courts
will use the strict scrutiny standard and the government will have
the burden to show it has a necessary and compelling interest justi-
fying its interference with the plaintiff’s fundamental right.212 The
court will also examine whether there are less restrictive means that
could be implemented.213
1.   The Parent-Child Relationship as a Fundamental Right
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child is protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.214 The Court has affirmed that related parental
interests falling under this original premise are similarly constitu-
tionally protected. For example, a parent’s right to educate his or her
children in the manner he or she chooses has been recognized as a
substantive due process fundamental right.215 The Court based its
                                                                                                                   
210. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (1965) (recognizing that in prior cases the
Court determined that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanation from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”). The Gris-
wold court concluded that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments thus
guaranteed the plaintiffs the fundamental right to privacy, although the right to privacy is
not specifically enumerated in the United States Constitution. See id. at 483-84.
211. See Mary M. Krupnow, Note, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.: Protecting Familial Bonds and
Creating A New Right of Access in the Civil Courts, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 621, 631-32 (1998).
 [T]he “Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Such rights are held to be “fundamen-
tal,” and if a statute threatens a fundamental right, the Court allows it to stand
only if the government can demonstrate a compelling interest. If a statute does
not interfere with a fundamental right, then the Court is deferential, examin-
ing the statute only for a rational relationship between the statute and a le-
gitimate state interest.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
212. See id.
213. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (“[I]f there are other, reason-
able ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity,
a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose ‘less
drastic means.’” (citation omitted)).
214. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (striking down a state parental
rights termination procedure as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due pro-
cess). The Court further added that, even where parents have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the state, the parental right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment does not evaporate. See id. at 753.
215. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (striking down a state
statute requiring children to attend only public schools because it interfered with the par-
ents’ right to determine their children’s education).
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decision on the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up-
bringing and education of children under their control.”216
Like the United States Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme
Court has also recognized that substantive due process protection
must be given to parents pursuant to the fundamental liberty inter-
est that parents have in the care, custody, and management of their
children.217 As a Florida Supreme Court justice noted:
The right of the parents to the custody, care and upbringing of
their children is one of the most basic rights of our civilization. The
emphasis upon the importance of the home unit in which children
are brought up by their natural parents is one of the great hu-
manizations of western civilization as contrasted with the ideolo-
gies of some nations where family life is not accorded primary con-
sideration.218
The following year, while addressing a grandparents’ rights statute,
the court noted that:
The extent to which the government should be involved in settling
disputes within the family is a relatively new question in the law.
There are, though, certain established principles. We have stated
that “this Court and others have recognized a longstanding and
fundamental liberty interest of parents in determining the care
and upbringing of their children free from the heavy hand of gov-
ernment paternalism.” The fundamental liberty interest in par-
enting is protected by both the Florida and federal constitutions.
In Florida, it is specifically protected by our privacy provision.219
Thus, under both the U.S. Constitution and the Florida Constitu-
tion, the court should recognize that both parents have a fundamen-
tal right to parent their child.
                                                                                                                   
216. Id. at 512.
217. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 966 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied
sub nom G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 116 S.Ct. 719 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has found
that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and man-
agement of their children, but that interest is limited regarding unwed fathers who do not
“demonstrate[] a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward
to participate in raising [their] child”); In re E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 1992) (recog-
nizing that a “constitutionally protected interest exists in preserving the family unit and in
raising one’s children”); Padgett v. Department of HRS, 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991) (af-
firming the “longstanding and fundamental liberty interest of parents in determining the
care and upbringing of their children free from the heavy hand of government paternal-
ism”).
218. In re EAW, 658 So. 2d at 983 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also
Foster v. Sharpe, 114 So. 2d 373, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959) (determining that the right to
raise one’s child is one of the most fundamental rights held by a parent and thus it must be
protected).
219. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996).
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C.   Procedural Due Process Requires a Fundamentally Fair Hearing
In custody determinations, fundamentally fair procedures are re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process re-
quirement, which protects “life, liberty, or property” interests.220
In a related procedure, a state-instituted termination of parental
rights proceeding, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the parents
had a substantive due process right to fair proceedings because the
parent-child relationship is protected as a fundamental right:
[P]arents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable de-
struction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced
dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for
procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention
into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy
weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with funda-
mentally fair procedures .221
It is well-recognized that “[a] fundamentally fair hearing requires
the procedural steps of notice, an opportunity to be heard, the oppor-
tunity to present evidence which is relevant and material, and arbi-
trators who are not infected with bias .”222 In Johnson v. Johnson ,223 an
Illinois appellate court invalidated a change of custody to a father be-
cause the judge demonstrated bias against the mother and refused to
grant a change of venue that had been waived in a settlement
agreement.224 The appellate court found that the settlement agree-
ment would waive the mother’s right to a fair and impartial judge, a
constitutional right that cannot be contravened.225
                                                                                                                   
220. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall . .
. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”)
221. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (emphasis added) (footnote omit-
ted). Although Santosky dealt with the termination of parental rights by the state, custody
proceedings similarly involve state interference with a parent’s right to determine the care,
custody, and management of his or her child, particularly the right of the non-custodial
parent. It is likewise essential that a custody determination provide both parents with a
fundamentally fair procedure. The exercise of gender bias through subjective determina-
tions is not a fundamentally fair procedure. The task thus centers on how to exorcise gen-
der bias from the custody determination process.
222. Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Dalton, 929 F. Supp. 1411, 1416 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
223. 340 N.E.2d 68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
224. See id. at 74-75.
225. See id. at 75, 78 (ordering that the mother’s request for change of venue be
granted due to the judge’s bias); see also In re N.C., C.P., and C.P., 479 So. 2d 200, 202
(Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (noting that the trial court’s refusal to consider evidence when deter-
mining custody of the children violated the mother’s and the children’s rights to a funda-
mentally fair hearing).
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V.   FLORIDA’S CHILD CUSTODY STATUTE
It is well-recognized in Florida that the controlling consideration
in a custody determination is the best interests of the child.226 Section
61.13, Florida Statutes , provides that the court shall consider and
evaluate all factors affecting the welfare of the child, including but
not limited to:
(3)(a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and
continuing contact with the nonresidential parent.
(b) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between
the parents and the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized
and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care,
and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience
to express a preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and en-
courage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between
the child and the other parent.
(k) Evidence that any party has knowingly provided false informa-
tion to the court regarding a domestic violence proceeding pursu-
ant to s. 741.30.
(l) Evidence of domestic violence or child abuse.
(m) Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant.227
The statute further states that:
[i]t is the public policy of this state to assure that each minor child
has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the
parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to
encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and
joys, of childrearing. After considering all relevant facts, the father
of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in
                                                                                                                   
226. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1997) (“The court shall determine all matters re-
lating to custody of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of
the child . . . .”).
227. Id. § 61.13(3).
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determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age
or sex of the child.228
A representative of the Florida Office of the State Courts Admin-
istrator stated that circuit court clerks are not required to report
data regarding when mothers or fathers receive custody of chil-
dren.229 Therefore, no Florida data currently exists to prove that, as
required by section 61.13(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes , judges equally
consider fathers when determining the primary residence of a child.
However, a recent U.S. Department of Commerce report stated that
of children living with one parent, 87% live with their mothers, while
13% live with their fathers.230 Thus, while a review of the statutory
considerations does not indicate an obvious preference that would re-
sult in mothers receiving primary residential custody in overwhelm-
ing numbers, by inference, national statistics indicate that Florida
follows the trend of primarily awarding custody of children to moth-
ers.231
                                                                                                                   
228. Id. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (emphasis added). Other states have similar statutes that re-
quire that both parents be considered equally when making a custody determination. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(E) (1997) (“The court in determining custody shall not pre-
fer a parent as custodian because of that parent’s sex.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(1)
(1997) (“[T]he court . . . shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent’s
sex.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(3) (1997) (“In considering a proposed custodian, the
court shall not presume that any person is better able to serve the best interests of the
child because of that person’s sex.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375(7) (1997) (“As between the
parents of a child, no preference may be given to either parent in the awarding of custody
because of that parent’s age, sex, or financial status, nor because of the age or sex of the
child.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(3) (1997) (“[T]he court shall not give preference to either
parent based on the sex of the parent and no presumption shall exist that either parent is
more fit or suitable than the other.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(2) (1997) (“Preference
must not be given to either parent for the sole reason that the parent is the mother or the
father of the child.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1997) (“In any proceeding involving the
custody of a minor child, the rights of both parents shall be equal.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
13.2(a) (1997) (“Between the mother and father, whether natural or adoptive, no presump-
tion shall apply as to who will better promote the interest and welfare of the child.”); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 43, § 112(3)(b) (1997) (“[T]he court shall not prefer a parent as a custodian of the
child because of the gender of that parent.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(4) (1997) (“No pref-
erence in custody shall be given to the mother over the father for the sole reason that she
is the mother, nor shall any preference be given to the father over the mother for the sole
reason that he is the father.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15 (Michie 1997) (“[A]s between the
parents there shall be no presumption or inference of law in favor of either.”); WIS. STAT. §
767.24(5) (1997) (“The court may not prefer one potential custodian over the other on the
basis of the sex or race of the custodian.”).
229. Telephone interview with Alene Miller, Statistics Consultant, Florida Office of the
State Courts Administrator (Apr. 10, 1997).
230. See STEVE W. RAWLINGS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILY
CHARACTERISTICS MARCH 1993 XV: XVIII 5-7 (1994). Another report similarly notes that
87-88% of all children in single-parent families live with their mothers. See SELTZER, supra
note 130, at 1. By inference, this indicates that Florida follows the national trend of over-
whelmingly awarding primary residential custody to mothers.
231. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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VI.   THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND CHILD CUSTODY
While fathers have raised equal protection challenges to the
mother-preference in custody determinations, it appears, at least at
the appellate level,232 that none have been successful—unless the
statute states a blatant presumption favoring mothers.233 Most chal-
lenges appear to have been dismissed either because the court ap-
parently had difficulty understanding the fathers’ arguments or be-
cause, according to the court, the fathers’ attorneys did not properly
present valid arguments backed by compelling facts capable of sup-
porting an equal protection claim. Similarly, very few cases claiming
that the child custody system violates the fundamental right to the
parent-child relationship appear to have reached the appellate level.
A.   Challenges From Divorcing or Formerly Married Fathers
In Ropoleski v. Rairigh,234 the Michigan federal district court
stated that the father “did not allege that he had been subjected to
adverse treatment because he is male, but that his former wife ha[d]
been granted preferential treatment, to his detriment.”235 After not-
ing that the father was making an equal protection challenge claim-
ing that a facially neutral policy had been administered unequally,
the court stated that the father must show not only that the defen-
                                                                                                                   
232. But see State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287, 291 (Fam. Ct. 1973)
(denying the mother’s request for custody based on the tender years doctrine because the
evidence in this trial court demonstrated that it was in the children’s best interests for the
father to receive custody, and following the “at least cursory invocation” of the tender years
presumption would violate the father’s right to equal protection of the law). The New York
statute at issue stated that “[i]n all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody
of the child in either parent, but the court shall determine solely what is for the best inter-
est of the child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness.” Id. at 287. Re-
search indicates that this is the only case that determined applying a mother-preference
under a facially neutral custody statute violated the father’s right to equal protection. No
appellate level cases appear to have found a violation of a father’s right to equal protection
in response to a father’s claim that the application of the tender years doctrine under a fa-
cially neutral custody statute violated that right.
233. See Cheri L. Wood, Comment, Childless Mothers?—The New Catch-22: You Can’t
Have Your Kids and Work for Them Too, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 383, 392 (1995) (“Consider-
ing it violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts no
longer applied the maternal custody preference for children of tender years.”) Wood also
notes that because “ninety percent of children went to the custody of their mothers[,]” the
maternal custody preference “was cited as statistical evidence of discrimination” and “‘sex-
ual stereotyping.’” Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Interestingly, a recent, successful, equal protection challenge involved a Pennsylvania
statute that required non-custodial parents to pay their children’s college tuition. See
Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995). The court struck down the statute as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause because married parents were not likewise required to pay
their children’s college tuition. See id. at 269.
234. 886 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mich. 1995). The court noted that the parties were in
federal court due to “an action for deprivation of various civil rights under color of state
law.” Id. at 1359.
235. Id. at 1363.
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dants’ conduct had a discriminatory effect, but that discriminatory
purpose was also a motivating factor.236 The court further noted that
“‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ implies that the decisionmaker selected a
course of action because of its detrimental effects on an identifiable
group. Error, mistake in judgment or arbitrary administration in ap-
plying a facially neutral policy does not violate equal protection.”237
The court then addressed the challenge:
Plaintiff has alleged, baldly, that [two court administrators], both
men, discriminated against him purposefully, pursuant to custom
or policy, because he is a man. The complaint provides no factual
detail in support of the claim. Plaintiff has not identified the dis-
criminatory policy or custom with any specificity. His allegations
offer no explanation as to why defendants’ alleged lenient or pref-
erential treatment of his former wife should give rise to a reason-
able inference that intention to injure him in his relationship with
his daughter, because he is a man, is the primary motivating fac-
tor. Not only is the claim not supported by factual details, but,
even when viewed in the abstract, it is not supported by reasoned
sense.
Though gender based discrimination is suspect, plaintiff as a
male, is not a member of a group whose interests have tradition-
ally been under-represented in the political process. Based on the
facts alleged, the notion that plaintiff’s injury is the result of gen-
der based discrimination—rather than, for instance, an erroneous
or even arbitrary exercise of discretion—is implausible. Plaintiff’s
equal protection claim is subject to dismissal as one “whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” To countenance such a claim un-
der the alleged facts would be to invite disgruntled parents every-
where to embroil the federal courts in child custody and support
disputes, matters traditionally and appropriately entrusted to the
state courts . . . simply by alleging gender discrimination. This, the
Court refuses to do.238
The court then dismissed the equal protection claim.239
In Fariello v. Rodriguez ,240 the father, appearing pro se, claimed
that numerous named defendants deprived him of equal protection
under the law.241 The court stated that a review of the “voluminous
complaint” provided no evidence that any government official inter-
preted any statute to single out the plaintiff.242 The court added that
                                                                                                                   
236. See id.
237. Id. (citations omitted).
238. Id. (citations omitted).
239. See id.
240. 148 F.R.D. 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
241. See id. at 677.
242. Id.
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no such action could foreseeably occur, either, and dismissed the ac-
tion with prejudice.243
B.   Challenges From Unwed Fathers
1.   Equal Protection Challenges in General
Equal Protection claims raised by unwed fathers generally arise
in the contested-adoption context. While adoptions are frequently
handled by family courts, they are usually governed by statutes
separate from those addressing custody when parents divorce.244
Nonetheless, many of the custodial issues are similar and provide in-
teresting insight into equal protection challenges. In particular, con-
tested adoption or out-of-wedlock custody cases demonstrate the
enormous differences in treatment between unwed mothers and un-
wed fathers.245
In Wyoming, a father adverse to placing his child for adoption
claimed an equal protection violation had been committed when the
mother of the child was allowed to place the child for adoption with-
out his consent.246 The Court restated what it believed to be the gist
of the father’s argument: that the court was “inferring that a young
man cannot take care of his child, while a young woman who does not
want her child, can and is fit because she is a woman.”247 The Court
stated that the father was arguing that “[i]f he was a woman, the
Court would very likely give the child to him.”248 Apparently confused
by the father’s argument, the court wrote:
GWJ [the father], of course, has no authority to assert BGH’s [the
child’s] right to equal protection. His standing does not permit him
to assert the rights of another. BGH’s guardian ad litem repre-
sents her interest, and the guardian ad litem stated: As the child’s
guardian ad litem, the undersigned asserts that her right to equal
protection under the laws has not been violated in any way, but
has, on the contrary, been zealously protected by the District Court
in these proceedings. As to his own right, GWJ’s argument is at
best obscure. We understand the gist to be that, because the court
did not rule in his favor, he was denied his right to equal protec-
tion. GWJ does not attack the [relevant statutes] as being facially
                                                                                                                   
243. See id. at 678. Fariello tried to bring an equal protection claim again in Fariello v.
Campbell, 860 F. Supp. 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), alleging that his rights and those of similarly
situated divorced males had been violated. The court dismissed the claim with prejudice
and sanctioned Fariello for bringing a frivolous suit. See id. at 71.
244. For example, in Florida, child custody issues arise generally under chapter 61,
whereas adoptions are handled under chapter 63.
245. For a review of some interesting cases highlighting the differences in treatment
between unwed fathers and unwed mothers, see Craig, supra note 81, Part II.B.
246. See In re the Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d 371, 373 (Wyo. 1996).
247. Id. at 380.
248. Id. at 380-81.
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unconstitutional or encompassing a discriminatory motive. We are
not able to discern any discrimination. . . . The adoption statute . . .
does not favor one class over another, and it does not endorse
mothers over fathers or women over men or adoptive parents over
birth parents. There can be no valid argument that the statute is
facially unconstitutional or encompasses a discriminatory mo-
tive.249
The court concluded that “GWJ fail[ed] to make any logical argument
in support of this claim of error.”250 It added that the father failed to
point to any portion of the record evidencing a denial of his right to
equal protection.251 Quoting the district court, the appeals court
noted that mother was identified as:
“the most sensible and mature of the two biological parents, but in
addition she is the most credible. . . .” Our examination of the rec-
ord does not permit us to conclude the district court was biased or
prejudiced against GWJ on gender grounds in this case. His right
to equal protection of the law was not violated, and his argument
must fail.252
2.   Challenges to Facially Discriminatory Statutes
Arizona has a statute that declares the mother of a child born out
of wedlock the child’s legal custodian until paternity is established.253
In Arizona v. Bean,254 after being convicted of custodial interference
for failing to return his child to the child’s mother following a visita-
tion, a father challenged the statute as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s and the Arizona Constitution’s Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses because it created a statutory distinction between
biological mothers and fathers.255 The father also argued that statu-
                                                                                                                   
249. Id. at 381.
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. Id. at 381-82 (citation omitted).
253. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1302(4)(B) (1997). The statute states: “If a child is born
out of wedlock, the mother is the legal custodian of the child for the purposes of this section
until paternity is established and custody and access is determined by a court.” Id. An un-
married father may initiate proceedings to establish his paternity by filing a verified com-
plaint. In the alternative, the parents of a child born out of wedlock can voluntarily ac-
knowledge paternity by filing with the clerk of the superior court either a birth certificate
signed by the mother and father, or an affidavit signed by both parents acknowledging pa-
ternity. See id. § 25-812. The mother of the child does not have a similar affirmative duty
to establish paternity, presumably because she gave birth to the child. It is important to
note that once one parent has been deemed the legal custodian of a child, it is very difficult
to change this designation. Florida has a similar “natural guardian” statute. See FLA.
STAT. § 744.301(1) (1997) (“The mother of a child born out of wedlock is the natural
guardian of the child.”).
254. 851 P.2d 843 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
255. The father submitted Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), in support of the
premise that “the state may not subject men and women to disparate treatment when
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torily embodied unequal treatment afforded to married, unmarried,
separated or divorced fathers similarly amounted to constitutional
violations.256
The court disagreed with the father’s argument that “there is no
difference in the importance between the maternal and paternal
roles” and that therefore no compelling state interest existed war-
ranting a distinction based on gender.257 The court first attacked the
argument by noting that although the Supreme Court has recognized
an unmarried father’s constitutionally protected interest in a rela-
tionship with his child,258 the Court “also recognized, however, that
such a right is not absolute and that protection of the child is also an
important state interest.”259 The court explained:
Thus, the importance of the paternal role in a child’s development
notwithstanding, we cannot say that equal custody rights between
all unmarried fathers and mothers effectuate the best interests of
the child. To the contrary, as suggested by one writer, such a prac-
tice could have “disastrous consequences” for the child. See
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adop-
tion Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev.
10 (1975). As the statutory presumption at issue here operates to
preserve the child’s interest in stability, it is not without a com-
pelling state interest such as referred to in Lehr. Moreover, be-
cause the presumption is operative only until paternity and cus-
tody in the child’s best interest are established by a court, it does
not go substantially beyond the protection of that interest.260
The father also argued that because he was similarly situated to the
mother he was entitled to protection equal to that provided to the
child’s mother as well as to married, divorced, and separated fa-
thers.261 Again, the court disagreed:
                                                                                                                   
there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state interest.”
Bean, 851 P.2d. at 844.
256. See Bean, 851 P.2d. at 845.
257. Id. at 844-45.
258. See id. at 845 (referring to Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)). In Stanley, af-
ter the death of the children’s natural mother, Illinois tried to remove the children from
the unwed father. The father claimed that Illinois’ failure to award him a fitness hearing
because he was an unwed father violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the denial of the hearing violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
259. Bean, 851 P.2d at 845. The court here is inferring that the protection of the child
is best served by presuming that mothers are more fit than fathers to serve as legal custo-
dians. This is gender discrimination.
260. Id. Bodenheimer’s then 17-year-old law review article argued that despite Stanley,
unmarried fathers should not receive custody rights equal to the mothers’, because it
“would have disastrous consequences for the child.” Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, New Trends
and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L.
REV. 10, 58 (1975). Like many courts, Bodenheimer presumed de facto that it is in the best
interests of all children for all mothers to have custody.
261. See Bean, 851 P.2d at 845.
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As in Lehr, we conclude that the parents here are not similarly
situated. The testimony at trial established that, while the mother
provided daily supervision, care and financial support for the child
from the time of his birth, defendant lived with the mother only
sporadically, living at times in another city, and provided what at
best can be described as minimal financial support. The evidence
was undisputed at trial that defendant never took any steps what-
soever to establish his paternity or exercised any custodial or visi-
tation rights and was not living with the mother and child in a de
facto family relationship at the time of the abduction. . . . The de-
fendant was never the caregiver or provider for the child. Thus, de-
fendant and the natural mother were similarly situated [only] in a
biological sense . . . .262
Despite recognition of the mother’s fundamental right to parent
the child because of giving birth to the child, the Bean court noted
that “‘[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships
more enduring.’”263 The court added that because the father had not
taken “a single step as required by statute to establish his paternity,
he cannot be said to be similarly situated with all married, divorced
and separated fathers.”264 The court noted that the Supreme Court
had specifically recognized that the “‘mere existence of a biological
link’ does not create parental rights deserving of protection under the
due process clause.”265
Concluding, the Arizona appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
declaration that the statute is substantially related to an important
state interest and is not a gender-based equal protection violation.266
                                                                                                                   
262. Id. at 845-46. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Supreme Court had
noted that:
the significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsi-
bility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child rela-
tionship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development.
If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a
State to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie.
Id. at 262. In essence, Arizona is forcing the parents into a wrestling match over the child
if the parents cannot parent together. To obtain custody in most cases, the father would
have to show that the mother is unfit to have custody of the child. Moreover, if a mother
and child live with a relative who primarily cares for the child while the mother spends lit-
tle or no time with the child, the mother would not likely lose custody of the child. Con-
versely, if a father does not proactively and significantly care for the child, he will likely
never receive custody.
263. Id. at 846 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Arizona’s statute, however, clearly provides the mother with a parental right
because of her biological connection to the child. All that is required of her to become the
legal guardian is to give birth to the child. See supra note 253.
264. Bean, 851 P.2d at 846.
265. Id. (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261).
266. See Bean, 851 P.2d at 847.
940 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:891
A Utah appeals court reviewed the issue of whether requiring the
father to register an acknowledgment of paternity violated the Equal
Protection Clause.267 The father argued that:
the similarly situated parents of an illegitimate child are given dif-
ferent legal rights solely on the basis of their sex since the
mother’s consent is required prior to any adoption of the child re-
gardless of whether she is willing to fulfill her parental responsi-
bilities while the father has the right to consent to the child’s
adoption only if he files an acknowledgment of paternity indicating
his willingness and intent to support the child.268
The court stated that the statute was designed to readily determine
the paternity of illegitimate children so as to “facilitate immediate
and continuing physical care of and emotional bonding opportunities
for such children.”269 The father argued that the statute was based on
gender differences not reasonably related to these purposes, in that:
the statute defeats its objective by failing to require the mother of
an illegitimate child to take action to identify herself as a willing
parent as fathers are required to do since an unfit and indifferent
mother can prevent the adoption of her child and, thus, fail to pro-
vide appropriate physical care and emotional bonding opportuni-
ties for the child.270
The father further argued that:
the statutory objective is also defeated because it results in gen-
der-based discrimination against “identified, present, and willing
fathers” who would, in fact, provide the necessary care and bond-
ing opportunities for the child, and that an indifferent mother can
arbitrarily deprive such a father of his parental rights under the
statute.271
The court responded by noting that the Utah Supreme Court held
that the statute did not violate the equal protection rights of an un-
wed father because he had the same rights as the mother or the fa-
ther of a legitimate child, if he timely filed an acknowledgment of pa-
ternity pursuant to the statute.272 Therefore, the court added, when
the father failed to timely file an acknowledgment of paternity or de-
velop a substantial relationship with the child, the Equal Protection
Clause did not preclude the state from terminating his parental
                                                                                                                   
267. See Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 761 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
268. Id. at 937. In reality, however, many fathers are not aware that they must file an
acknowledgment of paternity. Many believe that simply being listed on the birth certificate
is sufficient, but at least in Florida, it is not. See FLA. STAT. § 742.10(1) (1997).
269. Swayne, 761 P.2d at 937 (citation omitted).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 937-38.
272. See id. at 938.
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rights.273 The court noted that the state’s interest is to promptly iden-
tify fathers who will acknowledge parental responsibilities, and to
make children speedily available for adoption.274 As did the court in
Bean, this court dismissed the father’s “mere” biological link to the
child:
[F]athers who have “fulfilled a parental role over a considerable
period of time are entitled to a high degree of protection,” whereas
unwed fathers “whose relationships to their children are merely
biological or very attenuated” are entitled to a lesser degree of pro-
tection. . . . When an unwed father demonstrates a full commit-
ment to the responsibilities of parenthood by “com[ing] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child,” his interest in personal con-
tact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due
process clause. . . . But the mere existence of a biological link does
not merit equivalent constitutional protection .275
The court recognized that unwed mothers were “‘automatically iden-
tified by virtue of their role in the process of birth,’” but that if a
mother was shown to be unfit, the state could terminate her parental
rights.276 The court concluded that the gender differences in the
statutory classifications were reasonably related to the statutory
purposes.277
VII.   CHALLENGING GENDER BIAS IN CUSTODIAL DECISIONS
A.   Bringing an Equal Protection Challenge
Fathers seeking to bring an equal protection challenge in court
face many hurdles. Perhaps the biggest hurdle is proving that the
                                                                                                                   
273. See id. (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979)). In Caban, the Su-
preme Court struck down a New York statute that allowed unmarried mothers to withhold
their consent to an adoption but not unmarried fathers, even those who had established a
“substantial relationship” with their children. The Court held the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause, and stated:
The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed fathers as
being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a con-
cerned judgment as to the fate of their children. [The statute] both excludes
some loving fathers from full participation in the decision whether their chil-
dren will be adopted and, at the same time, enables some alienated mothers
arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of fathers. We conclude that this undif-
ferentiated distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers, applicable
in all circumstances where adoption of a child of theirs is at issue, does not bear
a substantial relationship to the State’s asserted interests.
Caban, 441 U.S. at 395.
274. See Swayne, 761 P.2d at 938.
275. Id. (quoting Wells v. Children’s Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984),
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983), and In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah
1982) (emphasis added)).
276. Id. (quoting Wells, 681 P.2d at 203).
277. See id.
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court intended to discriminate when it awarded custody of the chil-
dren to the mother because of gender discrimination.
In child custody statutes involving divorce cases, statutes that de-
lineate the mother as the primary custodian violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because they are facially discriminatory and the in-
tent to discriminate is obvious. Most states have repealed such laws
for this reason.278
When the statute is not facially discriminatory but purports to
treat both parents equally, as does Florida’s statute,279 the challenge
will be much more difficult. A father seeking to prove that his right
to equal protection of the law was denied must present evidence that
the law was administered in a discriminatory manner by the trial
judge.280 As demonstrated in the Ropoleski case, this is a difficult
standard to meet. Most judges do not state that they are awarding
custody to the mother because she is the mother; instead, they may
base their decision on a finding that the mother is the more fit parent
due to her role as the primary caretaker and that it is in the child’s
best interests to remain with her.281 Some states do not require
courts to make specific findings of fact for the record when deter-
mining custody, and courts in these states do not have to articulate
any reasons for their decisions. Florida is one of these states. The
failure to require specific findings on the record makes it highly diffi-
cult to prove exactly what motivated the judge’s decision, and thus
                                                                                                                   
278. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
279. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1997) (“After considering all relevant facts, the fa-
ther of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the
primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child.”).
280. See supra note 196.
281. As noted above, the primary caretaker standard may be a thinly veiled mother-
custody preference. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why
awarding custody based on a party’s designation of “primary caretaker” will not necessar-
ily meet the best interests of a child). Interestingly, a state task force examining whether
gender bias exists in mother-preference custody presumptions found that despite the
statutory eradication of this presumption, “some trial judges continue to enforce the pre-
sumption as before, automatically placing young children with their mothers irrespective
of other facts and circumstances.” THE MISSOURI TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE,
REPORT OF THE MISSOURI TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE (1993), reprinted in 58 MO.
L. REV. 485, 561 (1993). Despite confirming that “gender neutrality must be observed in all
child custody cases, so that each case is decided on its objective merits,” the task force
nonetheless found that the primary caretaker presumption was an acceptable standard
upon which to base custody determinations, even though “[t]he necessary result . . . will be
placement with the mother in most cases where both parents seek custody and both are
fit.” Id. at 562-63. The task force found that this presumption “would not constitute gender
bias against fathers; it would merely reflect a general societal pattern upon which people
agree during the stability of marriage.” Id. at 563. But see MINN. ST. § 518.17(13) (1997)
(“The primary caretaker factor may not be used as a presumption in determining the best
interests of the child. The court must make detailed findings on each of the factors and ex-
plain how the factors led to its conclusions and to the determination of the best interests of
the child.”).
1998]                         FAMILY COURTS AND CHILD CUSTODY 943
opens the door for the court to interject gender biases favoring
mother-custody when making a custody determination.282
In 1991, the Georgia Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial
System released a report listing “[c]ulturally based gender-biased
beliefs that influence some judges and disadvantage fathers.”283 The
Commission found that these beliefs included:
A.  The belief that a mother is a better parent than a father.284
B. The belief that children, especially young children, need to be
with their mothers.285
C. The belief that a father cannot work outside the home and be a
nurturing parent.286
D. The belief that because a mother is presumed to be the better
parent, fathers must prove the mother “unfit” in order to gain cus-
tody.287
E. The belief that if a court grants custody to a father, it brands
the mother as “unfit” and “unworthy.”288
The Commission noted that in addition to the actual application of
these biases by judges, “perceptions of gender bias discourage fathers
from seeking custody by creating a ‘chilling effect,’” thus convincing
fathers that it is not worth their effort to even seek custody.289
                                                                                                                   
282. See Garrison, supra note 155, at 401 (“Judges today have more discretion in di-
vorce cases than in any other field of private law.”).
283. COMMISSION ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUD. SYS., GENDER & JUSTICE IN THE
COURTS: A REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA BY THE COMMISSION ON GENDER
BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1991), reprinted in 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 539, 657 (1992)
[hereinafter GEORGIA STUDY].
284. Id. at 657-58 (noting that “American society has tended to assume that mothers,
rather than fathers, should and do have primary responsibility for raising children”).
285. Id. at 659 (listing public commentary, including testimony from a father who
noted that he had heard the judge ask an attorney in a custody matter, “How many times
have you seen a judge award custody of a five-year-old to the father?” to confirm that “the
‘tender years’ presumption is alive and well in Georgia courts” (footnote omitted)).
286. Id.
287. Id. (noting that: “[a]n attorney from South Georgia testified that in her experience
the test is not what is in the best interest of the child, but rather whether or not the
mother is fit. If the mother is fit then the father will not be awarded custody, and this is
gender bias against fathers”). Other attorneys testified that “a fit mother would not lose
custody no matter how appropriate it might be to give custody to the father,” and one testi-
fied that he had “been told by judges in pretrial conference[s] that he will not get anywhere
in the custody battle unless he has some ‘dirt’ on the mother.” Id. at 659-60 (footnote omit-
ted).
288. Id. at 660 (noting that despite extensive evidence that a mother was psychologi-
cally unstable and that it would not be in the best interests of the children to remain with
her, the judge nonetheless awarded custody to the mother because “‘it does something to a
mother’” to lose her children).
289. Id. The report also lists “culturally based gender-biased beliefs that influence
some judges against mothers.” Id. at 662. These beliefs include “[t]he belief that an older
boy needs to be with his father” and “the belief that a mother who works outside the home,
whether because of ambition or economic necessity, is less fit to be awarded custody than a
man . . . because these women are not good mothers.” Id. Such gender-biased beliefs like-
wise have no place in the family court system because they are not only patently unfair to
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To address the problem of gender bias in Florida’s custody deter-
minations, during the 1998 legislative session Senator Katherine
Harris290 introduced a bill that would require judges to state in writ-
ing the findings of fact upon which they based their custody deci-
sion.291 The bill includes findings that state:
[S]ome residents of this state have a perception that, despite the
gender neutrality of [the custody statute], the law is being applied
by trial courts in a gender-biased manner, and
[S]uch a perception, if grounded in fact, is unacceptable, is con-
trary to children’s best interest, and is contrary to the public policy
of this state, and
. . . .
[A] lack of a record of trial court proceedings can prevent mean-
ingful review or other analysis of trial court action . . . .292
The legislation seeks to ensure that trial courts adhere to the legisla-
tive policy of considering both parents equally when making a cus-
tody determination.293
A father or fathers could also claim that, as a group, fathers have
been denied equal protection of the law as a collateral effect of a cus-
tody policy, rather than through the application of express discrimi-
nation by a state actor (here, the trial judge). Notably, however, in
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 294 the Supreme
Court required that the group whose rights were infringed upon
demonstrate that nearly all of its members were discriminated
against to prove that the state intended to discriminate.295
Thus, absent express gender-bias by a trial judge, fathers alleging
that the law is applied in a discriminatory manner may be required
to demonstrate an absolute preference for mothers over fathers; that
is, at the trial level no fathers receive custody. In one particular
courtroom or in some small, remote counties this may be the case,
and then a plaintiff may actually be able to prove a 100% impact. A
particular judge might never award custody to fathers, and may even
                                                                                                                   
the rights of mothers to equally parent their children, but they can result in custody
awards that are not truly in the best interests of the children.
290. Repub., Sarasota.
291. See Fla. SB 1812 (1998) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1)). The
bill states:
If a judicial determination of parental responsibility, residential responsibility,
or both is made by the trial court after a hearing on the merits and based on
the factors set forth in subsection (3), the court shall state in writing the find-
ings of fact based on competent substantial evidence found in the record and
the conclusions of law on which its decision is based.
Id.
292. Id.
293. See id. The bill died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
294. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
295. See id. at 282 (finding that a nearly 100% impact is required to constitute an
equal protection violation).
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make comments indicating that, as a rule, he or she never awards
children to fathers because, for example, “Children belong with their
mothers.” A “mere” disparate impact on fathers, however, will not
likely be enough to prove an equal protection violation.296 Invidious
discrimination must be demonstrated.297 It may be inferred from a to-
tality of the facts, including the fact that the law bears more heavily
on one group than another.298 Thus, as depicted in Rogers v. Lodge,299
a voting rights case involving racial discrimination, a statistical
showing of the impact is key to the claim.300
Because the gender of the parents is at issue, a reviewing court
should apply intermediate scrutiny to determine if there is a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.301 The state must show that its
interest is substantially related to an important governmental inter-
est.302 In a custody case, that interest is to further the best interests
of the child.303 A court that has an overt or covert policy of awarding
children to mothers would have to show that this policy is substan-
tially related to the governmental interest of meeting the best inter-
ests of the child. There is a wealth of information which states that
children need both fit parents to be significantly involved in their
upbringing.304 Thus, a child’s needs would be better met by an award
of joint physical or rotating custody where the parties reside within
the same locale and can reasonably cooperate regarding the ar-
rangement.305 Where the parties do not reside within the same locale,
or where the parties are unable to cooperate, and one party must be
deemed the primary residential caretaker, the best interests of the
child are met not by following a policy that awards children to moth-
                                                                                                                   
296. See supra note 196.
297. See supra note 196.
298. See supra note 196.
299. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
300. See supra note 196. Notably, however, Rogers involved racial discrimination,
which receives strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny. Also, no African Ameri-
cans had ever been elected within the relevant district, which was a 100% impact on the
protected group. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623.
301. See supra note 186.
302. See supra note 186.
303. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1997) (“The court shall determine all matters re-
lating to custody of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of
the child . . . .”).
304. See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Pa. 1990) (“The demise of gen-
der stereotypes, and a wide and growing body of research indicating the importance of both
parents to healthy child development have caused courts to reconsider the efficacy of the
sole custody/visitation concept of post-divorce allocation of parental authority.” (footnote
omitted)); supra Part III.E (listing statistics from a variety of governmental and private
sources that conducted research which showed that children suffer when both parents are
not actively and meaningfully involved in their lives).
305. Section 61.13(3) states that courts should consider which parent “is more likely to
allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent.” FLA. STAT.
§ 61.13(3) (1997). Joint physical or rotating custody would more sufficiently meet this re-
quirement.
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ers solely because they are women, but by a careful analysis of who is
the overall more fit parent regardless of gender.
B.   Bringing a Substantive Due Process Challenge
A father may also bring a cause of action based on state interfer-
ence with a substantive due process fundamental right. While this
issue has arisen in the contested-adoption context,306 it should also
apply to divorced fathers when the state discriminatorily provides
custody to mothers.
A claim that fundamental rights have been violated requires the
reviewing court to apply strict, rather than intermediate, scrutiny.
Thus, the state would need to show a necessary and compelling in-
terest to justify its interference with the father’s fundamental right.
This argument might best be raised in a situation where both par-
ents are fit, reside in the same community, and are suitable for ro-
tating or joint physical custody, yet the trial court awards the mother
primary residential custody and the father visitation of every other
weekend.307 When an activity is constitutionally protected, as is the
fundamental right to parent, a state must chose the least restrictive
means possible to achieve its goal.308 Absent good cause, it would ap-
pear that the court, in this situation, would be interfering with the
father’s fundamental right to parent his child; the father, then,
should be entitled to a review of strict scrutiny.
If the appellate court finds that the trial court did interfere with
the father’s fundamental right to parent his child without a compel-
ling state interest, the court could remand the case and order that
the father’s right to parent his child be reflected through rotating or
joint physical custody, or through a greater award of visitation. How-
ever, the appellate court could make such a determination itself.
C.   Challenging Fundamentally Unfair Hearings
The failure to provide a fundamentally fair hearing is a violation
of procedural due process, a constitutionally protected right.309 Proce-
dural due process requires that the party whose interest is threat-
ened be provided with a meaningful opportunity to be heard.310 In-
                                                                                                                   
306. See supra Part IV.B.1.
307. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting that an award of every other
weekend visitation is still the “standard visitation schedule”).
308. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (“[I]f there are other, reason-
able ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity,
a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose ‘less
drastic means.’” (citation omitted)).
309. See supra Part IV.C.
310. See Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Dalton, 929 F. Supp. 1411, 1416 (N.D. Okla. 1996).
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herent in this right to be heard is a right to a fair proceeding;311 the
interjection of gender bias into a proceeding violates the requirement
that the hearing be fair.312 Thus, judges who make custody determi-
nations not on a record basis, but on the basis of gender bias, violate
procedural due process.313
Ideally, a father bringing a claim should be supported by a tran-
script from the trial court proceeding that evinces discriminatory
comments made on the record.314 However, even this evidence of judi-
cial discrimination can be ignored by the reviewing court. For exam-
ple, in Dalin v. Dalin,315 the North Dakota Supreme Court denied the
father’s claim that the roughly equal custody arrangement that had
been modified to allow the mother to have custody for nearly nine
and a half months of the year was motivated in part due to gender
bias.316 The court reviewed the trial court transcript, which contained
questions demonstrating that the trial court had used stereotypical
caretaking roles in making its decision.317 After stating that “[g]ender
bias in judicial proceedings is wholly unacceptable,”318 the court
noted that:
if the trial court assumed that fathers, as a group, are incapable of
adequately raising their daughters, it would be relying on an im-
proper factor to determine custody. Trial courts should not “per-
petuate the damaging stereotype that a mother’s role is one of
caregiver, and the father’s role is that of an apathetic, irresponsi-
ble, or unfit parent.”319
Nonetheless, because the father had admitted that the child’s
grandmother assisted him with “training that might best be done by
a woman,”320 the court found that his request for permanent sole cus-
tody was appropriately denied,321 although the father had had sole
custody for four months prior to the custody modification, and had
presented evidence that the mother had a history of alcohol abuse
and an unstable life.322
                                                                                                                   
311. See id.
312. See Johnson v. Johnson, 340 N.E.2d 68, 76-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
313. See Prudential, 929 F. Supp. at 1416.
314. See Johnson, 340 N.E.2d at 78 (finding that the mother’s and the children’s rights
to a fundamentally fair hearing were denied by reviewing discriminatory comments made
on the trial court transcript).
315. 512 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1994).
316. See id. at 689.
317. See id.
318. Id. (citations omitted).
319. Id. (quoting In re Dubreuil, 629 So.2d 819, 828 (Fla.1993)).
320. Id.
321. See id. at 691.
322. See id. at 687-88. The dissenting justice said that he “was convinced that if the
gender of the parties had been reversed, the result would have been the opposite.” Id. at
691 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
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A father may challenge gender bias by claiming that the court has
violated his right to equal protection of the laws, his fundamental
right to parent his child, and his procedural due process right to a
fair hearing. Ideally, any claims should be supported by discrimina-
tory comments recorded in a transcript. Absent this proof, a father
may choose to research custody records within a particular clerk of
the court’s office to determine whether any fathers have been
awarded primary residential custody by a particular judge.323 Be-
cause of cases such as Feeney, the unfortunate fact is that claimants
will likely need to show a nearly 100% impact on the affected group.
In any event, it is hoped that fathers raising this challenge will be
able to call to the court’s attention the serious breach of their rights
when fathers are discriminated against in custody decisions because
of their gender. An increase in these claims may put courts on notice
that fathers intend to see that their constitutional rights are upheld,
and that courts absolutely must, for the best interests of children,
fairly and justly weigh both parents equally when primary residen-
tial custody must be determined.
Fathers may have greater success with claims that trial courts
have violated their fundamental right to parent their children. Be-
cause it is well-established that the right to parent one’s child is a
fundamental, constitutionally protected right, strict, rather than in-
termediate, scrutiny should be applied by the appellate court.324 The
state must have a compelling reason for interfering with the funda-
mental right.325 In the least, it is hoped that this type of appeal will
allow a father to acquire a significantly increased amount of time
with his child, if not rotating or joint physical custody. Some fathers
may be able to impress upon the trial court the sanctity of the par-
ent-child relationship, and the seriousness with which custody de-
terminations must be approached to ensure that the fundamental
right to parent is minimally infringed upon.
Regarding a father’s right to a fair hearing, a transcript is almost
certainly essential to prove to an appellate court that the custody
hearing was not fundamentally fair. Thus, whenever possible, fa-
thers should have court reporters record custody proceedings. In
conjunction with the requirement that states require judges to sub-
mit their custody awards in writing, with detailed findings of fact,326
                                                                                                                   
323. Until courts are required to report which parent has been awarded custody to the
clerks of the circuit courts, the only way to obtain this information is for one to conduct
one’s own research. See infra Part VIII.E (recommending that courts be required to report
this information to prove that, as required by facially neutral statutes, fathers are being
considered equally when custody is determined).
324. See supra Part IV.B.
325. See Krupnow, supra note 211, at 631-32.
326. See infra Part VIII.D.
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it is hoped that the increased use of trial transcripts will help to root
out gender bias which results in fundamentally unfair proceedings.
VIII.   RECOMMENDATIONS
A.   End “Selective Discrimination”
Misandry has been defined as “the attribution of negative quali-
ties to the entire male gender.”327 Today, it is politically correct
within our culture to belittle and berate men, although the very same
treatment toward women could result in a civil lawsuit.328 This is se-
lective discrimination .
While the male power structure undoubtedly deserves criticism,
males alone do not defend and uphold its principles; indeed, many
women support male values, such as individualism, liberty, produc-
tion, and competition. Moreover, as evidenced in family court, for ex-
ample, males can be victimized by the male power structure, which
perpetuates the myth that, to be recognized as valuable, fathers
must economically provide for their families.
However, to discriminate against individual men because they are
men is an entirely different matter. As women and minorities have
argued for the last thirty years regarding their particular interests,
men, too, should be evaluated on an individual, non-discriminatory
basis, especially when it comes to custody of children. To do other-
wise extinguishes the ability to fairly evaluate and administer the
placement that is in the best interests of children.
In 1996, NOW issued National Conference Resolutions announc-
ing that the organization was preparing a counterassault against all
fathers’ rights groups because their recent successes—primarily leg-
islation that inched fathers minimally forward to permitting them to
spend more time with their children—threatened “all women.”329
What is so wrong with fathers spending more time with their
children? For many women, this change presents a threat in the only
arena in which they clearly have an advantage: the family court. On
the one hand, it is hard to blame women for fighting tooth and nail to
maintain every inch of the status quo they enjoy within our legal sys-
tem. But because women have fought for—and won—the right to en-
ter into traditional male domains, women should therefore under-
stand what it feels like to be subject to oppression, based on a physi-
cal characteristic. Instead of judging all males “in the form of univer-
sals, rather than in the form of particulars of individual parents’ ex-
                                                                                                                   
327. PATRICK M. ARNOLD, WILDMEN, WARRIORS, AND KINGS 52 (1991).
328. See FARRELL, supra note 61, at 294-96.
329. NOW, NOW Action Alert on “Fathers’ Rights” (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<http://www.now.org/organiza/conferen/1996/resoluti.html>.
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periences,”330 women must recognize the important role most fathers
play in the lives of their children. Furthermore, women should take
this recognition one step further:
Theoretical literature depicts “mothering” as an activity exclusive
to women. Fathers will continue not to be custodial parents as long
as societal divisions of child care responsibility persist. Feminist
theory could do much toward exploding the myth that parenting is
a sex-linked trait, and toward fostering an understanding of how
men can nurture and take on child care responsibilities.331
Indeed, many women might ask “Why should we encourage fa-
thers to care for and seek custody of children when it will leave us as
second class citizens in the workplace and at home?” Because wel-
coming fathers into the childcare sphere benefits women as well as
children, in that it frees women of oppressive stereotypical roles and
allows men to explore and incorporate traditionally female-identified
characteristics, making both women and men better people; because
it is undoubtedly in the best interests of children to have the maxi-
mum amount of love and care from both fit parents; because having
been subjugated by gender bias, women should know better and thus
should be true to female values, such as communitarian inclusion,
rather than tyrannical oppression. Discrimination against fathers
not only unjustly harms fathers, but even more significantly, harms
children who suffer when their fathers are treated as insignificant,
disposable factors unessential in the lives of their children.
B.   Implement “Courtwatch” Programs to Empirically Examine
Contested Custody Decisions
Problematically, many gender bias studies gather their data
through subjective surveys, questionnaires, and personal testimonies
rather than through empirical examinations of the actual custody-
making decision in the courtroom.332
Objective data regarding custody awards should be gathered to
determine whether the gender-biased application of gender-neutral
laws is occurring. Legislatures should either fund their own studies,
fund studies by the judiciary, or contract out to private organizations
to develop a methodology for tracking, categorizing, and analyzing
custody awards in selected, representative areas. Moreover, until
trial judges are required to provide written findings supporting their
                                                                                                                   
330. Levit, supra note 165, at 1078.
331. Id. at 1078-79 (citations omitted). This is particularly true considering that for
decades a major complaint of many women has been that men need to become more nur-
turing and empathic. Encouraging fathers to assume caretaking roles develops these at-
tributes through hands-on caring for children.
332. See generally MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 106; GEORGIA STUDY, supra
note 283.
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reasons for awarding custody or primary residency to one parent over
another,333 a courtwatch program should be funded and implemented
to monitor the way courts, witnesses, and experts treat mothers and
fathers in custody litigation.
Implementing these two recommendations should inform policy-
makers of what is truly considered when family courts make custody
decisions.
C.   Implement a Statutory Presumption in Favor of Joint Physical or
Rotating Custody
Recognizing that children need both parents, some states have
passed legislation that presumes that parents will share parental re-
sponsibility of children.334 In some states, statutes invoke a presump-
tion that joint custody is in the best interests of children when both
parents agree to it.335
In 1997, the Florida Legislature passed a bill stating that rotating
custody is a viable option for judges to consider when determining
custodial arrangements.336 Rotating custody means that parents who
live within the same community can split custody of the child fifty-
fifty, such as where the child lives one week with one parent, and a
subsequent week with the other parent.
Florida, and all states, should establish a rebuttable presumption
in favor of not only shared parental responsibility but also joint resi-
dential or rotating custody when both parents are fit and live within
the same community. The presumption should be defeated only if in-
dependent, corroborated facts demonstrate clearly that rotating cus-
tody is not in the best interests of the child.337 The presumption
should not be defeated merely because the parent likely to be the
custodial parent does not want to engage in rotating custody. An op-
portunity to opt out merely by choice places noncustodial parents,
                                                                                                                   
333. See infra Part VIII.D.
334. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (1997) (“The court shall order that the paren-
tal responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that
shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child.”).
335. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-152(5)(c) (1997) (“If both parents request joint custody,
the presumption is that joint custody is in the best interest of the child. Joint custody shall
be granted in the final order of the court unless the court makes specific findings as to why
joint custody is not granted.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1996) (“There is a presump-
tion, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child
. . . where the parents have agreed to joint custody or so agree in open court at a hearing
for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child.”).
336. See Act effective July 1, 1997, ch. 97-242, § 2, 1997 Fla. Laws 4436, 4437 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 61.121 (1997)) (“The court may order rotating custody if the court finds that
rotating custody will be in the best interest of the child.”) (emphasis added).
337. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Crumley, 695 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (upholding an
award of rotating custody because “[t]he evidence reflected that the child had adjusted well
to the rotating custody that had been in effect prior to the trial court’s order; in fact, there
was evidence that the child thrived in the arrangement”).
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usually fathers, at the mercy of the custodial parent. This result fa-
vors the mother because if she declines to support rotating custody
she has a much greater chance of receiving primary residential cus-
tody.
D.   Require Judges to Make Specific Findings of Fact When
Determining Custody
In Florida, the law currently does not require judges to make spe-
cific findings as to why they are awarding primary residential cus-
tody to one parent over another.338
Chapter 61 should be amended to require that when making pri-
mary residential custody determinations, judges must state on the
record specific findings as to why they are awarding primary residen-
tial custody to a particular parent.339 Presently, most judges simply
state that they find it is in the best interests of children that the
mother receive primary residential custody, without specifically
stating why they are making that finding. Requiring these findings
to be made in detail and on the record would better indicate whether
judges are truly considering the statutory criteria of gender neutral-
ity when making custody determinations. This requirement would
also help to demonstrate when judges are abusing their discretion
and exercising gender bias when making their determination. Fi-
nally, specific findings stated on the record would better preserve the
issue for appeal. Under the current practice, an appellate court is
highly unlikely to reverse a judge’s custody determination because
the statute allows judges to exercise broad subjective discretion and
reviewing courts usually award great deference to trial court judges’
decisions.
E.   Require Clerks of the Circuit Courts to Record Which Parent
Receives Primary Residential Custody
Although Florida’s child custody statute states that “[a]fter con-
sidering all relevant facts, the father of the child shall be given the
same consideration as the mother in determining the primary resi-
dence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child,” 340 statis-
tics are not being kept by the clerks of the circuit courts to confirm
that courts are adhering to this statutory requirement. There is cur-
rently no evidence that fathers are being considered as primary resi-
dential custodians to the same degree that mothers are considered.
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1998]                         FAMILY COURTS AND CHILD CUSTODY 953
Indeed, the evidence appears to indicate that Florida follows the na-
tional trend of awarding primary residential custody to mothers in
overwhelming numbers. Therefore, in order to enforce adherence to
the statutory requirement that fathers be considered equally when
custody is determined, either the legislature or the supreme court
should require circuit courts to report whether the mother or the fa-
ther receives primary residential custody during the initial custody
determination of the divorce proceeding.
F.   Revise Child Support Guidelines
Although the very troublesome topic of child support is beyond the
scope of this Comment, courts should note that United States Gen-
eral Accounting Office statistics demonstrate that two-thirds of all
fathers with child support arrearages are incapable of paying the
amount ordered.341
More often than not, these “guidelines” are adhered to as the ab-
solute law rather than simple guidelines. States should realize that
child support can be an impediment to the father-child relation-
ship.342 For example, when fathers reside a significant distance away
from their children, excessive child support can interfere with the fa-
ther’s ability to spend time with his children due to transportation
costs. Additionally, child support guidelines do not take into account
that fathers must set up separate residences requiring furnishings
and other accommodations and supplies for children. For example,
the report on which Florida’s current child support guidelines are
based states that the author drafted the guidelines according to a
two-parent intact family model, rather than incorporating the reality
                                                                                                                   
341. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, GAO/HRD-92-39FS 10
(1992); Ewing Testimony, supra note 19 (“A number of studies, including at least one
funded by the Federal government, have found that a parent’s recent employment status
and ability to pay [are] . . . important predictors of noncompliance.”). Ewing also notes
that:
According to a GAO review of the Census Bureau data, 66 percent of noncom-
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thers were unable to pay. However, noncustodial parents are not provided the
AFDC-safety net as are custodial parents. If we define a “deadbeat” as a parent
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obliger.
Id.
342. See, e.g., FLORIDA COMM’N ON RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD, ANNUAL REPORT,
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS Attachment V (1997) (noting that “Florida’s child support
guidelines may be an obstacle or barrier to the involvement of otherwise responsible fa-
thers in their children’s lives”).
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of two separate households.343 Second household set-up and mainte-
nance costs were intentionally excluded.344 With the move toward
joint and rotating custody of children, the need to include these costs
within the child support formula becomes even greater. The exclu-
sion of such costs is not only patently unfair to noncustodial parents,
but to children as well who suffer when their noncustodial parent is
subject to actual, or near abject, poverty, or cannot provide an addi-
tional home that parallels the quality of the home offered by the
mother. As Cynthia L. Ewing, a Senior Policy Analyst with the Chil-
dren’s Rights Council noted:
[F]or a child support system to work, the levels of child support
must be reasonable and based on the TRUE costs of raising chil-
dren. In practice, the child support guidelines are none of the
above. Child support guidelines must reflect the basic fact that it
costs more to maintain two households than one. Excessive child
support awards which force obligors to work 2 or 3 jobs in order to
meet their support payment are NOT serving the best interests of
our children. Parents caught in this trap simply do not have the
time to parent, to provide the emotional support and guidance
which our children desperately need. Excessive support awards
which drive obligors themselves into poverty or homelessness are
NOT serving the best interests of our children. While the media is
quick to note that many custodial parents, primarily mothers, are
living in poverty, they fail to report that the same may also apply
to noncustodial parents. A University of Wisconsin study found
that 58% of non-custodial parents are living below the poverty
level. Congress must recognize the unfortunate fact that children
of divorced or separated parents may never exist at the same stan-
dard of living they enjoyed as an intact family. Congress must ac-
cept that the overwhelming majority of children of unwed parents
will likely be raised at a standard of living at or below the poverty
level, regardless of the bureaucracy’s success at collecting child
support.345
States should implement study commissions composed of genu-
inely unbiased members including custodial and non-custodial fa-
thers and mothers who can redesign child support guidelines to in-
clude costs necessary to set-up and maintain both households.
Moreover, non-custodial parents with fifty-fifty custody should not
be required to pay child support as long as the child’s reasonable
needs are met in both households. Women should recognize the dis-
honesty of arguing for social equality yet voluntarily submitting
                                                                                                                   
343. COMMITTEE ON FAMILY LAW AND CHILDREN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES INTERIM
PROJECT REPORT 1 (1997) (noting that the Florida Legislature must review the guidelines
to determine whether they are an “accurate estimate of the expenses of an ‘intact’ family”).
344. See id. at 35 (noting that Policy Studies, Inc., the group which computed the
guidelines, stated that visitation costs are not included “in any way”).
345. Ewing Testimony, supra note 19.
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themselves to the traditional experience of extracting financial sup-
port from men to support children when it is not necessary to support
the reasonable needs of the children.346 In most cases, responsible fa-
thers who are allowed to remain involved in their children’s lives will
financially contribute directly to the child’s care as they did prior to
the divorce. Funding for needs beyond those which are reasonable
should not be routed through mothers via state-instituted wealth
transfers.
G.   Implement True Parity in the Workplace
In the end, the most effective way to correct the post-divorce ineq-
uities between the sexes is simple: correct pay inequality in the
work force. If the wage gap were wiped out between the sexes, a
federal advisory council concluded in 1982, one half of female-
headed households would be instantly lifted out of poverty.347
Women, and men, should proactively seek eradication of the glass
ceiling and should pursue true economic and social values parity for
women in the workplace. True parity, however, does not mean that
women should be expected to adopt the male-norm in the workplace;
instead, the workplace should fully integrate behavior culturally
identified as female-based:
Women have tried too long and too hard to be like men. The second
stage of the social transformation must be for men to become more
like women. The traditional male power base in the workplace no
longer simply can bring women on board, and expect them to
thrive and prosper because they are there. Rather, the workplace
must become more humane and inviting for all. It must recognize
that workers have personal lives and that families require time
and attention, and integrate these factors into the workplace.348
With the transformation in gender roles so that now both parents
are expected to care for children and work, quality, inexpensive day-
care, preferably on workplace premises, is essential. Both parents
should be equally and actively encouraged by employers to play a
significant role in the lives of their children. Employers should per-
mit parents to engage in alternative work hours or to work from the
home via telecommuting. Fathers, as well as mothers, should take
leave from work when necessary to care for their children. These are
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347. FALUDI, supra note 7, at 25.
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just a few examples of ways in which employers should actively in-
corporate behavior culturally identified as female within the work-
place.
IX.   CONCLUSION
The evidence is overwhelming and demands that we re-examine the
wisdom of conventional custody . Unless you believe that a father’s
value to his children diminishes after divorce, it is hard to justify a
custody policy that routinely and automatically disrupts the di-
vorced father’s relationship with his children. The notion that only
mothers are important to their children is false; it is time to jetti-
son it from custody policy.349
If the treatment fathers receive in the family court occurred in the
workplace, an affirmative action plan would likely be implemented to
rectify the pervasive discrimination and barriers fathers encounter
as they seek meaningful access to their children in family courts.
Ample evidence exists to prove that children need loving fathers to
substantively care for them. Many fathers stand ready and willing to
take on this charge, despite societal messages that “real men don’t
take care of children.” As Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal
noted in Willey v. Willey,350 courts should do all that is possible to en-
courage fathers to embrace their fatherhood, rather than interject
barriers and gender bias to confine fathers to insignificant child care
roles. In turn, mothers should encourage the father-child relation-
ship, and should seek and expect true parity in the workplace that
incorporates culturally female-identified values.
As the twentieth century concludes, both mothers and fathers,
and all members of society, including judges, must work actively to
discard outdated gender stereotypes that are no longer relevant and
that oppress both men and women at home, in the workplace, and in
family court. The health and well-being of children depend on the
ability of both parents, and all others, to work cooperatively to
achieve this critical goal.
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